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Article 
The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment 
HENRY S. NOYES 
For the second time in twenty-five years, personal jurisdiction has perplexed the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  The problem is purposeful availment.  All of the Justices agree that 
specific jurisdiction does not exist without purposeful availment, but the Court could not 
cobble together a majority opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro to clarify 
what purposeful availment means or what it requires.   
This Article sets forth a simple—yet meaningful and necessary—solution.  Purposeful 
availment is best understood by its negative:  no court should find a nonresident defendant 
subject to personal jurisdiction for a contact with the forum state that the defendant could 
not reasonably prevent.  Put another way, where it is not reasonably feasible for a 
defendant to sever its connection with the state, purposeful availment does not exist.  
Conversely, where it is reasonably feasible for a defendant to prevent its contact with a 
state but it has not done so, there is presumptively purposeful availment and, subject to the 
fairness balancing, specific jurisdiction. 
This principle is consistent with the understanding reached by the Court more than 
twenty-five years ago and shared by a majority of the current Justices that personal 
jurisdiction is an individual liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.  
Because it is an individual liberty interest, the purposeful availment requirement must be 
applied in such a manner that an economic actor can structure its conduct so as to avoid 
subjecting itself to jurisdiction in a disfavored forum. 
Application of this principle leads to clear, but certain to be controversial, resolution 
of several questions left unresolved by the Court in McIntyre v. Nicastro.  It also makes 
clear that Nicastro itself was wrongly decided.  First, component part manufacturers 
generally do not control the distribution and point of sale of the end product into which 
their component part is incorporated.  Thus, absent some additional conduct targeting the 
forum state, component part manufacturers do not purposefully avail themselves of a 
particular state where the end product is sold, even where there is a regular flow of a large 
quantum of the component parts into that state.  Second, end product manufacturers retain 
nearly complete control over the initial point of sale of their products.  Thus, an end 
product manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of every state where the product is 
sold to consumers—even where the manufacturer sold the product to a distributor who sold 
the product to a retailer who sold the product to a consumer.  Third, a manufacturer who 
markets its product nationwide has purposefully availed itself of every state where the 
product is sold and causes injury. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court decided two personal jurisdiction cases in 2011.  
One of the two was a specific jurisdiction case—J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro
1—that focused on purposeful availment.  This is not 
surprising because the issue of whether a state court may properly exercise 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who did not consent to 
jurisdiction and who was not present in that state arises frequently in all 
types of litigation.
2
  What is surprising is that it took so long for the Court 
to consider the issue despite the fact that the rules and standards for 
specific jurisdiction—and, in particular, what constitutes purposeful 
availment—have long remained unclear. 
Prior to the two personal jurisdiction cases that the Supreme Court 
promulgated in 2011, it had been nearly twenty-five years since the 
Supreme Court last considered whether a state court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has no physical presence in 
the forum jurisdiction.
3
  That decision, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court,
4
 did not result in a majority opinion.  All nine Justices 
agreed that the Due Process Clause governed the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, that the Due Process Clause required analysis of the 
defendant’s contact with California (the forum state), and that the 
defendant’s contact with California was not relevant unless such contact 
was the result of defendant’s purposeful availment of California.5  But the 
Justices disagreed sharply regarding the appropriate standard for 
determining whether a defendant’s contact with the forum state rises to the 
level of purposeful availment and whether the defendant in Asahi had, by 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.  This paper benefitted from feedback 
from my colleagues at a presentation at Chapman.  I thank Shana, Charlie and Edie for their support. 
1 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
2 Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion); see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out of the Personal 
Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 531 (1995) (“[T]he threshold determination of 
personal jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal courts . . . .”). 
3 The Supreme Court has considered only one other major personal jurisdiction case in the last 
twenty-five years.  In that 1990 decision, the Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a 
California court over a nonresident, natural-person defendant who was validly served with process 
while physically located in California.  Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 607, 627–28 (1990). 
4 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
5 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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its conduct, purposefully availed itself of California.
6
  Thus, Asahi did little 
to clarify the rules and standards for determining when a state does or does 
not have jurisdiction over an absent defendant.
7
  The passage of time has 
only amplified the lack of clarity.  The lower courts have not reached a 
consensus about the meaning and application of “purposeful availment” 
and, of the nine Justices who participated in Asahi, only Justice Scalia 
remains on the Supreme Court today.  
For those expecting some clarity regarding the rules and standards for 
specific jurisdiction, especially regarding the meaning and application of 
the purposeful availment requirement, Nicastro is a disappointment.
8
  
Nicastro did not result in a majority opinion.  Instead, the Justices split 
four-two-three.  Six Justices agreed that the defendant did not purposefully 
avail itself of the forum state and that personal jurisdiction was therefore 
improper, but the Justices again split sharply in their reasoning.
9
  What, if 
anything, can we learn from Nicastro?  The result in Nicastro was not 
surprising in that it was arguably consistent with existing precedent.  But 
the various opinions in Nicastro reveal a great deal about the views of the 
current Supreme Court Justices regarding personal jurisdiction.  Justice 
Kennedy—writing for Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice 
Roberts—wants to establish a new, more rigorous approach to personal 
jurisdiction that would limit the number of defendants who may be sued in 
state courts and would eliminate the fairness analysis as redundant.
10
  
Justice Ginsburg—joined in her dissent by Justices Kagan and 
                                                                                                                          
6 See id. 
7 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion) (“The rules and standards for determining when 
a State does or does not have jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of decades-
old questions left open in Asahi . . . .”). 
8 See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum 
Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (describing the Court’s opinion in J. 
McIntyre as “a disaster” and stating that the Court “performed miserably”); see also John N. Drobak, 
Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031301 (“The finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction in Nicastro is the 
worst result in any personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court in the modern era.”); Allan 
Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 345 (2012)  (stating that the three McIntyre opinions 
“exacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal confusion” and that each opinion “demonstrated a 
disappointing level of judicial competence”); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s Sovereignty Got to Do 
with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) 
(“Personal jurisdiction . . . seems to inspire foolish remarks and poor opinions, and Nicastro, may set a 
new low in that regard.”); Michael Richards, Whose Due Process?, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (Oct. 4, 
2011), http://www.nyujll.com/2011/10/whose-due-process.html (“J. McIntyre actually worsens the 
state of affairs and further confuses the jurisdictional analysis not only by failing to offer a clear 
framework for courts to use but also by introducing substantial uncertainty about the basic nature of the 
due process question to be answered.”). 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
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Sotomayor—wants to extend the personal jurisdiction doctrine to subject a 
foreign defendant to suit in a forum state court when it targets the U.S. (in 
its entirety) as a market and its product is sold in the forum state.
11
  Justice 
Breyer—joined concurring in the judgment by Justice Alito—rejected 
Justice Kennedy’s view, but indicated that he was not yet willing to join 
Justice Ginsburg.
12
  Before resolving the issue of purposeful availment, 
Justice Breyer wants to wait for a case that requires the Court to confront 
the “many recent changes in commerce and communication.”13 
A careful parsing of the various Nicastro opinions provides significant 
guidance to state and federal trial courts struggling to resolve personal 
jurisdiction issues.  Several established principles remain valid.  The 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause, 
which still requires analysis of the defendant’s contact with the forum 
state, and such contact is still not relevant unless it was the result of the 
defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum state. 
We also learned that a majority of the Court appears to accept the 
views expressed in each of the three Asahi opinions as valid proof of 
purposeful availment for an end product manufacturer.  Thus, an end 
product manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of the forum state 
when the plaintiff can establish either of the following two circumstances:  
(1) the defendant had a “regular flow” or “regular course” of product sales 
in the forum state, rather than a small number of isolated sales;
14
 or (2) the 
defendant purposefully targeted forum state customers which would 
include “special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing” or 




Where does that leave us on the meaning and application of purposeful 
availment?  In this Article, I argue that purposeful availment can best be 
understood by its negative.  In the Court’s opinion in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
16
 Justice White wrote that a corporation 
that purposefully avails itself of a particular state “has clear notice that it is 
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome 
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to 
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the 
State.”17 
It is not always feasible, however, for a corporation to sever its 
                                                                                                                          
11 See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
12 See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
13 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
14 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
15 See id. 
16 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
17 Id. at 297. 
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connection to a state.  Sometimes a corporation has no ability to control 
whether a product reaches a particular state.  Where it is not reasonably 
feasible
18
 to prevent the contact with the forum state, purposeful 
availment—and therefore specific jurisdiction—does not exist.  
Conversely, where it is reasonably feasible for a nonresident defendant to 
sever its connection to a state but it has not done so, there is presumptively 
purposeful availment of that state. 
For example, a small manufacturer of cups and saucers located in West 
Virginia who makes sales exclusively from its West Virginia shop cannot 
prevent its cups and saucers from ending up in Hawaii.
19
  A resident of 
Hawaii might visit West Virginia, or a resident of West Virginia might 
purchase a set of cups and saucers to send as a wedding gift to a relative in 
Hawaii.  It is not reasonably feasible for the West Virginia manufacturer to 
“sever” such ties to Hawaii and thus there is no purposeful availment—
even if the purchaser told the manufacturer at the time of the sale, “I can’t 
wait to send these lovely cups and saucers to my cousin in Hawaii!”  By 
contrast, there is purposeful availment for a single sale made to a Hawaii 
resident who, in response to an ad placed in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser 
by the West Virginia manufacturer, calls a toll-free telephone number, 
purchases the cups and saucers with a credit card, and arranges for the 
manufacturer to ship them to Hawaii.  The West Virginia manufacturer 
could have prevented this contact with Hawaii but did not. 
These are the relatively easy cases.  Even the cases that have been 
difficult for the Court—where there is an intervening distributor, for 
example—are best understood by considering whether it is reasonably 
feasible for a defendant to prevent its contact with the forum state.  For 
example, component part manufacturers generally do not control the 
distribution and point of sale of the end product into which their 
component part is incorporated.  For the component part manufacturer, the 
target “consumer” is the end product manufacturer.  Thus, absent some 
additional conduct targeting the forum state, component part manufacturers 
do not purposefully avail themselves of a particular state, even where there 
is a regular flow of a large quantum of the component parts into that state.  
This conclusion will limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and insulate, 
to a degree, component part manufacturers from liability. 
End product manufacturers, on the other hand, retain nearly complete 
                                                                                                                          
18 By “reasonably feasible,” I mean something that is literally possible to achieve and also is 
economically and technologically practical given the circumstances. 
19 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an 
equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small 
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a 
large distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).”).   
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control over the point of sale of their products.  Thus, an end product 
manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of every state where the 
product is sold to consumers—even where the manufacturer sold the 
product to a distributor, who sold the product to a retailer, who, in turn, 
sold the product to a consumer.  This conclusion will greatly expand the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over end product manufacturers, 
particularly foreign end product manufacturers. 
Likewise, the Court must adopt Justice Ginsburg’s position that a 
manufacturer who markets its product to the entire United States has 
purposefully availed itself of every state where the product is sold and 
subsequently causes injury.
20
  It is a simple matter for a manufacturer to 
avoid marketing its product in certain undesirable states.  Therefore, it 
defies reason and reality to conclude that a manufacturer who seeks to sell 
its product in every state has not purposefully availed itself of any state. 
This analysis is consistent with the notion that personal jurisdiction is 
an individual interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.  This 
interest can be waived both before and after litigation arises.
21
  An 
objection to personal jurisdiction can also be forfeited or waived by an 
inattentive or careless defendant after litigation commences.  Because 
personal jurisdiction is an individual liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause, it must be applied in such a manner that it fosters “a 
degree of predictability to the legal system” that makes it reasonably 
feasible for careful and assiduous “potential defendants to structure their 




This analysis also confirms that Nicastro was wrongly decided for two 
independent reasons.  First, the United Kingdom end product manufacturer 
had control over the distribution of its product and easily could have 
avoided distribution in New Jersey.  Second, the manufacturer also 
marketed its product in the entirety of the United States, thus hoping for 
sales in New Jersey and every other state. 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION  
A complete history of the development of the law of personal 
jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article.  A brief overview of the 
development of the law of personal jurisdiction is necessary, however, to 
identify and separate those issues that were settled from those that were 
                                                                                                                          
20 See id. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under past Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, a manufacturer who markets its product to the entire United States is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in every state where the product is sold); see also discussion infra Part VIII.F.   
21 See discussion infra Part VII (discussing how courts will need to assess objections to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants). 
22 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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unsettled as the Court considered Nicastro. 
A.  Territoriality 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that the Due Process Clause protects a defendant against a 
state court’s exercise of power over that defendant unless the state court 
has personal jurisdiction over that defendant.
23
  The Supreme Court 
initially grounded personal jurisdiction on a theory of “exclusive power 
based on territoriality: each state sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of 
all other sovereigns’ jurisdiction, to bind persons and things present within 
its territorial boundaries.”24  Absent the defendant’s consent to 
jurisdiction,
25
 the defendant’s presence within the territory of the forum 




B.  The International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test 
In its seminal 1945 decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
27
 
the Supreme Court abandoned its then-existing test—“is the defendant 
physically in the state”—in favor of a test that focuses on the 
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction in the light of the relationship 
between the defendant and the forum state.
28
  Although still a Due Process 
issue, the International Shoe test of personal jurisdiction is based on a 
conceptual scheme with two prongs: (1) contact between the defendant and 
the forum state; and (2) fairness.
29
  The test asks whether a nonresident 
defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that 
the exercise of jurisdiction would not “offend traditional notions of fair 
                                                                                                                          
23 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186 (1977). 
24 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.2 at 214 (2d ed. 2009); see also 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial 
limits of the State in which it is established.”); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.2 
at 100–01 (4th ed. 2005).  Personal jurisdiction is sometimes referred to, even today, as “territorial 
jurisdiction.” Id. § 3.1 at 99 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 55 (1982)). 
25 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.5 at 106–07. 
26 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733). 
27 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
28 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (describing International Shoe as 
“the seminal case” and noting that the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence “ha[s] 
abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s ‘presence’ within a State in favor of a 
more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the 
context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State”). 
29 RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4.4 at 81 (2d ed. 2009); CLERMONT, supra note 24, 
§ 4.2 at 212 (“[D]ue process dictates both that the forum must have power over the target of the action 
and that litigating the action there must be reasonable.”). 
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play and substantial justice.”30 
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court distinguished between the 
concepts of “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction.”31  The 
Supreme Court recently reiterated this distinction in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
32
 a “general jurisdiction” case that was 
argued and decided on the same date as Nicastro.  General jurisdiction 
exists when a defendant engages in substantial in-state activity that is 
“continuous and systematic.”33  When a court has “general jurisdiction” 
over a defendant, the defendant may be sued in the forum state even where 
the lawsuit is wholly unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state.
34
  For example, an individual may be sued in his or her domicile 
state, while a corporation may be sued either in its state of incorporation or 
in the state where it has its principal place of business—even if the events 
giving rise to the lawsuit have nothing to do with the forum state.
35
  By 
contrast, adjudicatory authority is “specific” when the lawsuit arises out of 
or derives from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.36  Where a 
court determines that it has “specific jurisdiction” over a defendant, it 
means that specific action can proceed in that court.  It does not mean that 
that defendant can be sued in that forum generally—that is, for other 
matters unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.37 
The Nicastro decision and this Article focus on specific jurisdiction.  
In particular, I consider the rules and standards for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over (1) a nonresident defendant (2) who is not present (and 
therefore not served with process) in the forum state and (3) has neither 
consented to jurisdiction nor (4) waived or forfeited the objection to 
jurisdiction.  This is the factual scenario where the International Shoe test 
applies and the forum court must evaluate the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state and the fairness of forcing an unwilling defendant to litigate in 
a foreign forum. 
Under the International Shoe test, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing a relevant contact.  The defendant bears the burden of 
                                                                                                                          
30 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31 See id. at 318 (“While it has been held . . . that continuous activity of some sorts within a state 
is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, 
there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.” (citations omitted)).   
32 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
33 Id. at 2853. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 
37 Id. at 2851. 
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establishing the constitutional unfairness of the forum.
38
  Absent 
establishment of a relevant contact, the issue of fairness is irrelevant.  “No 
matter how overwhelming the showing of fairness in the forum might be, 
there can be no jurisdiction without an initial finding that the defendant has 
a relevant contact with the forum.”39  
Not all of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are relevant.  A 
relevant contact must involve “purposeful availment”: the defendant’s 
conduct must be intentionally directed toward the forum state.
40
  
Serendipitous contacts between the defendant and the forum state do not 
count.  For example, the unilateral act of the plaintiff taking defendant’s 
product into the forum state does not constitute purposeful availment.  
Likewise, a contact is relevant only if the contact makes it foreseeable that 
the defendant might eventually be sued in the forum state as a result of its 
conduct directed toward the state.
41
 
Simply identifying a relevant contact is not the end of the inquiry.  The 
International Shoe test requires a balancing of “minimum contacts” against 
fairness.  The minimum contacts portion of the test assesses both the 
quantity of contacts and the “quality” of contacts between the defendant 
and the forum state.
42
  The greater the quantity of relevant contacts, the 
more likely that jurisdiction will be appropriate.  The higher the “quality” 
of the relevant contacts, the more likely that jurisdiction will be proper.  
The “quality” of a contact with the forum state is determined by its 
relationship to the facts that give rise to the underlying lawsuit.  And the 
“quality” of the contacts is more important than the quantity.  
“International Shoe Co. v. Washington made the point that as the level of 
the defendant’s state-directed activity increases, the state’s constitutional 
power extends to claims less related to that activity.”43  Even a single 
contact, however, will constitute “minimum contacts” sufficient to support 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction when the contact with the forum state 
is the very basis for the action.
44
  
                                                                                                                          
38 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); CLERMONT, supra note 24,  
§ 4.2 at 212; FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 85.  
39 FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 80; see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.11 at  
135–36 (4th ed. 2005); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic 
Influence of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 552 (2012) (“Only if a defendant-initiated contact is 
established will a court consider the fairness and reasonableness of jurisdiction.”). 
40 Freer, supra note 39, at 561 (“[I]f there is no contact caused by purposeful availment, there can 
be no jurisdiction.”). 
41 FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 81; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.11 at 139–41. 
42 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.10 at 128–29. 
43 CLERMONT, supra note 24, § 4.2 at 223; see also id. §4.2 at 229 (“[A]n increase in 
unrelatedness requires a higher level of activity.”); FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.3 at 72–73 (discussing 
same). 
44 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (stating that, over time, courts had 
established that certain minimum contacts—such as “consent,” “presence,” and  
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If the plaintiff establishes the requisite minimum contacts, then the 
burden switches to the defendant to establish unfairness—that it would 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require this 
defendant to litigate in this forum.  The Court has identified five relevant 
factors to the fairness analysis.  The (1) burden on the nonresident 
defendant of litigating in the forum is balanced against: (2) the forum 
state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution possible; and (5) 
“the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.”45 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 
The Supreme Court first discussed the concept of purposeful availment 
in its 1958 decision Hanson v. Denckla.
46
  Hanson involved a Delaware 
corporate defendant who had established a trust in 1935 for Mrs. Donner, a 
Pennsylvania resident, and who then acted as trustee.
47
  In 1944, Mrs. 
Donner moved to Florida, where she remained until her death in 1952.
48
  
When litigation regarding the trust ensued in Florida state court, the 
defendant objected to personal jurisdiction.
49
  The Supreme Court agreed 
with the defendant and held that the unilateral activity of a plaintiff or non-
party does not satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts with the forum 
state.
50
  The Court wrote that “it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”51 
The Court later clarified: 
This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a 
result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the 
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.  
Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts 
                                                                                                                          
“doing business”—permitted courts to exercise personal jurisdiction when the contact with the forum 
state is the very basis of the action);  Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352, 353–56 (1927) (permitting a 
Massachusetts agent to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania resident where the motor 
vehicle accident in question occurred in Massachusetts itself); FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.3 at 72–73; 
id. § 2.4.4 at 74–76; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.10 at 128. 
45 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
46 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
47 Id. at 238. 
48 Id. at 239. 
49 Id. at 250.   
50 Id. at 253. 
51 Id. 
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proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that 
create a substantial connection with the forum state.
52
 
Still, the meaning and application of the purposeful availment requirement 
has given rise to frustration in the courts, and among academics and 
practitioners alike.  To understand the divergent views of the Supreme 
Court Justices, it helps to review the Supreme Court’s most recent (pre-
Nicastro) decisions. 
A.  World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
53
 the plaintiffs brought 
a products liability action in Oklahoma state court.
54
  The plaintiffs had 
purchased a new Audi automobile from defendant Seaway Volkswagen, 
Inc., a local car dealership in Massena, New York.
55
  One year after the 
purchase, the plaintiffs left their New York home for a new home in 
Arizona.
56
  The plaintiffs were driving their Audi through Oklahoma on the 
way to Arizona when they were rear-ended by another car and injured in 
the resulting fire.
57
  The plaintiffs sued the local New York dealership 
(Seaway) where they had purchased the car and the regional distributor 
(World-Wide Volkswagen).
58
  World-Wide and Seaway then entered 
special appearances to argue that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 




Both Seaway and World-Wide were incorporated and had their 
respective principal places of business in New York.
60
  Although both 
companies had contractual relationships with the manufacturer and 
importer of the plaintiffs’ Audi, they were fully independent 
corporations.
61
  Neither Seaway nor World-Wide “d[id] any business in 
Oklahoma, ship[ped] or s[old] any products to or in that State, ha[d] an 
agent to receive process there, or purchase[d] advertisements in any media 
calculated to reach Oklahoma.”62  In fact, there was no evidence “that any 
automobile sold by World-[W]ide or Seaway ha[d] ever entered Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                          
52 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
53 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 





59 Id.  Plaintiffs also sued the German manufacturer (Audi) and the U.S. importer (Volkswagen of 
America), but neither of those defendants contested personal jurisdiction.  Id. 
60 Id. at 288–89. 
61 Id. at 289. 
62 Id. 
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with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present case.”63  
The Oklahoma state court nevertheless rejected the defendants’ argument 
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the defendants’ writ petition,64 
because “the product being sold and distributed by the petitioners is by its 
very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible 
use in Oklahoma” and “petitioners derive substantial income from 
automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma.”65 
In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
66
  The Court 
reaffirmed the principle that a state court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if (1) there “exist minimum 
contacts between the defendant and the forum State” and (2) “maintenance 
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”67  According to the Court, determining whether maintenance of 
the suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
is a test of reasonableness or fairness.
68
 
The Court noted that the “limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the 
Due Process Clause, in its role as guarantor against inconvenient litigation, 
have been substantially relaxed over the years” due largely to the increase 
in interstate and international commerce and the availability and 
affordability of modern communication and transportation.
69
  The Court 
nevertheless held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case 
would be inappropriate because the defendants “carr[ied] on no activity 
whatsoever in Oklahoma.”70   
The Court acknowledged that “an automobile is mobile by its very 
design and purpose” and it was therefore foreseeable that the plaintiffs’ 
automobile would be driven to Oklahoma and cause injury there.
71
  The 
Court held, however, that the defendants’ product being placed by the 
defendants in the “stream-of-commerce” and taken to Oklahoma through 
the unilateral act of the plaintiffs, although foreseeable, did not warrant the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.
72
  The 
Court noted that a finding of jurisdiction would frustrate the ability of 
“potential defendants to structure their primary conduct” so as to avoid suit 
in Oklahoma and other jurisdictions.
73
   
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. 
64 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 355 (Okla. 1978), rev’d, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980). 
65 Id. at 354. 
66 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 299.  
67 Id. at 291–92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 Id. at 292. 
69 Id. at 292–93. 
70 Id. at 295. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 295–98.  
73 Id. at 297.   
 54 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:41 
The Court limited the scope of its holding by noting that the 
defendants did not seek to serve the Oklahoma market either directly or 
indirectly.
74
  Although a number of Volkswagen service centers were 
located in Oklahoma, the defendants did not own or operate these service 
centers and they earned no direct revenue from the service centers.  The 
Court described this as a “collateral relation” to Oklahoma that did “not 
stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State.”75 
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the defendants “purposefully 
inject[ed] the [Audi] into the stream of interstate commerce” and the Audi 
was then “predictably used in the forum State.”76  Justice Marshall (joined 
by Justice Blackmun) also dissented, arguing that jurisdiction was proper 
because it was based “on the deliberate and purposeful actions of the 
defendants themselves in choosing to become part of a nationwide, indeed 
a global, network for marketing and servicing automobiles.”77 
B.  Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court 
Seven years later, the Court revisited the issue of specific jurisdiction.  
Like World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi Metal Industry, Co. v. Superior 
Court,
78
 involved a product liability claim resulting from a vehicle 
collision.  There, the plaintiff lost control of his motorcycle and collided 
with a tractor, injuring the plaintiff and killing his passenger wife.
79
  The 
plaintiff filed a product liability action in California state court, alleging 
that his motorcycle’s tire, tube and sealant were defective.80  The plaintiff 
sued several defendants, including component parts manufacturer Cheng 
Shin Rubber Industrial Co, Ltd. (Cheng Shin), who was the Taiwanese 
manufacturer of the tube.
81
  Cheng Shin then filed a cross-complaint 
seeking indemnification from another component part manufacturer, Asahi 
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s 
valve assembly.  The plaintiff later settled and dismissed all of his claims.  
As a result, the only remaining claim for the California state court to 




California’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction to 
the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.
83
  Asahi moved 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at 297–98.   
75 Id. at 298–99. 
76 Id. at 306–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
78 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
79 Id. at 105. 
80 Id. at 105–06. 
81 Id. at 106. 
82 Id. 
83 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2012). 
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to quash the service of summons on the grounds that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by the California state court was inconsistent with the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
84
  Asahi was a 
Japanese corporation that had no offices, property, or agents in California 
and it solicited no business and had no direct sales in California.
85
  Asahi 
manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan and sold them to Cheng Shin 
and other tire manufacturers.  Cheng Shin also purchased valve assemblies 
from other manufacturers.  Asahi’s sales to Cheng Shin took place in 
Taiwan.  Cheng Shin incorporated the valve assemblies it purchased from 




Cheng Shin bought a significant number of valve assemblies—
approximately 1,350,000 over a five-year period—from Asahi, but these 
sales were a small part of Cheng Shin’s overall business.87  Cheng Shin 
estimated that approximately twenty percent of its sales in the United 
States were in California, but the record did not indicate what percentage 
of Cheng Shin’s total sales were made to the United States.88  In an 
informal survey of one cycle store in California, an attorney for Cheng 
Shin determined that the store contained 115 tire tubes.  Of those 115 
tubes, 21 contained Asahi valve stems and 12 of the 21 Asahi valve stems 
were incorporated in Cheng Shin tire tubes.
89
   An affidavit of a manager of 
Cheng Shin responsible for purchasing component parts stated:   
In discussions with Asahi regarding the purchase of valve 
stem assemblies the fact that [Cheng Shin] sells tubes 
throughout the world and specifically the United States has 
been discussed.  I am informed and believe that Asahi was 
fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to my Company 
and to others would end up throughout the United States and 
in California.
90
   
The president of Asahi, by contrast, declared that Asahi had “never 
contemplated that its limited sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan 
would subject it to lawsuits in California.”91  
The California Superior Court denied the motion to quash, stating: 
“Asahi obviously does business on an international scale.  It is not 
unreasonable that they defend claims of defect in their product on an 
                                                                                                                          
84 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
85 Id. at 106–08. 
86 Id. at 106–07. 
87 Id. at 106. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 107. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).   
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international scale.”92  The California Court of Appeal disagreed, 
concluding that “it would be unreasonable to require Asahi to respond in 
California solely on the basis of ultimately realized foreseeability that the 
product into which its component was embodied would be sold all over the 
world including California.”93  The California Supreme Court agreed with 
the superior court and concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
was proper because “Asahi knew that some of the valve assemblies sold to 
Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in California, and 
that Asahi benefited indirectly from the sale in California of products 
incorporating its components.”94 
All nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court voted to reverse, finding 
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process 
Clause.
95
  Eight Justices signed on to Part II.B. of Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion, which concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Asahi would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”96  The only remaining parties to the action were a Japanese 
corporation and a Taiwanese corporation.  The indemnification claim arose 
from a transaction that took place in Taiwan.  The burden on defendant 
Asahi to defend an action in a foreign legal system was great.  The 
interests of Cheng Shin and the California court in exercising personal 
jurisdiction over Asahi were minimal.
97
  In addition, the Court made 
special note of the policy implications given the international context of 
the dispute:  
The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a 
state court’s assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant 
will differ from case to case.  In every case, however, those 
interests, as well as the Federal Government’s interest in its 
foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction 
in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious 
burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal 
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.
98
 
The Justices could not agree, however, whether Asahi had established 
minimum contacts with California necessary to satisfy that portion of the 
personal jurisdiction test.  Justice O’Connor—joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia—wrote a plurality opinion that 
                                                                                                                          
92 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
93 Id. at 107–08 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Id. at 108. 
95 Id. at 102–04.   
96 Id. at 102–04, 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 114–15. 
98 Id. at 115. 
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focused on the concept of purposeful availment.
99
  Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that minimum contacts with the jurisdiction only counted if 
they were based on an act of the defendant bringing its products to the 
forum state with the expectation that they would be purchased by 
consumers in the forum state—as opposed to serendipitous or fortuitous 
contact with the jurisdiction based on “a consumer’s unilateral act of 
bringing the defendant’s product into the forum State.”100  
The mere act of manufacturing a product and placing it “in the stream 
of commerce” where it might eventually be swept into the forum state is 
not enough to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
101
  Instead, the 
O’Connor plurality indicated that the contact with the forum state “must 
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State.”102  This would include: 
[A]n intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, 
for example, designing the product for the market in the 
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing 
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the 
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor 
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.  
But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce 
may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not 
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream 
into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.
103
 
The O’Connor plurality concluded that Cheng Shin failed to 
“demonstrate[] any action by Asahi to purposefully avail itself of the 
California market.”104 
The Brennan plurality concurred in the result—based on the 
conclusion that it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction in this 
instance—but disagreed with the O’Connor plurality about the 
“interpretation . . . of the stream-of-commerce theory” and “the conclusion 
that Asahi did not ‘purposefully avail itself of the California market.’”105 
Justice Brennan concluded that the Court’s decision in World-Wide 
Volkswagen distinguished between the circumstance where a consumer 
                                                                                                                          
99 Id. at 109–13 (plurality opinion). 
100 Id. at 109. 
101 Id. at 110. 
102 Id. at 112. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  Justice O’Connor explicitly refused to consider whether “Congress could, consistent with 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over an 
alien defendant based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the 
defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.”  Id. at 113 n.*. 
105 Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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unilaterally and fortuitously transported a defendant’s product to the forum 
state and one in which the defendant’s product was regularly sold in the 
forum state through an established chain of distribution.
106
  On this point, 
Justice Brennan stated: 
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents 
or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products 
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a 
participant in this process is aware that the final product is 
being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit 
there cannot come as a surprise.  Nor will the litigation 
present a burden for which there is no corresponding benefit.  
A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of 
commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the 
final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from 
the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial 
activity.  These benefits accrue regardless of whether that 
participant directly conducts business in the forum State, or 
engages in additional conduct directed toward that State.
107
 
Justice Stevens also concurred in the result, but wrote separately 
(joined by two other Justices) to state that the fact alone that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair required reversal.
108
  
Although he therefore found it unnecessary for the O’Connor plurality to 
“articulate ‘purposeful direction’ or any other test as the nexus between an 
act of a defendant and the forum State that is necessary to establish 
minimum contacts,” he concluded that the O’Connor plurality had 
misapplied that very test.
109
  Justice Stevens noted that “[w]hether or not 
[Asahi’s] conduct r[ose] to the level of purposeful availment require[d] a 
constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value and 
the hazardous character of the components.”110  Asahi and Cheng Shin had 
engaged in “a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over 
100,000 units annually over a period of several years.
111
  This activity was, 
for Justice Stevens, far more significant than simply placing a product in 
the stream of commerce.
112
   
                                                                                                                          
106 Id. at 119–20. 
107 Id. at 117. 
108 Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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IV.  J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO  
In September 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
113
 a case whose facts would require 
the Court to revisit its muddled jurisprudence regarding purposeful 
availment.
114
  Nicastro involved a foreign manufacturer who placed its 
product into the “stream of commerce” by selling it to a U.S. distributor 
based in Ohio who then sold the product to a New Jersey business where it 
ultimately injured a New Jersey resident in New Jersey.
115
 
Plaintiff Robert Nicastro filed a products liability action in New Jersey 
state court against the defendant J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (“J. 
McIntyre”), a company incorporated in England and operating its principal 
place of business there as well.
116
  Nicastro injured his hand at work in 
New Jersey while running a metal-shearing machine that J. McIntyre had 
manufactured in England.
117
  Following the defendant’s objection to the 
New Jersey state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and subsequent 
appeals, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exercise of 
jurisdiction was appropriate.   
Jurisdictional discovery revealed that the “defendant does not have a 
single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up 
in this state.”118  Although one of the defendant’s machines ended up in 
New Jersey, the defendant never marketed or shipped goods to New 
Jersey.
119
  Instead, the offending machine was sold to the plaintiff’s New 
Jersey employer by the defendant’s “exclusive American distributor,” a 
separate company.
120
  The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the defendant had no “presence or minimum contacts in [New Jersey]—in 
any jurisprudential sense—that would justify a New Jersey court to 
exercise jurisdiction.”121  That court concluded, nevertheless, that “a 
foreign manufacturer that places a defective product in the stream of 
commerce through a distribution scheme that targets a national market, 
which includes New Jersey, may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                          
113 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). 
114 See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Clarifying Personal Jurisdiction . . . or Not, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 28, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personal-
jurisdiction-or-not.html (“The Court granted cert in McIntyre to resolve a question that had been left 
open 25 years ago in Asahi: whether putting a product into the stream of commerce expecting it to 
reach a particular state was sufficient purposeful availment or whether the defendant must somehow 
‘target’ the forum (through some ‘plus’ activities).”). 
115 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
116 Id. (plurality opinion). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 2790 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119 Id. at 2786.  
120 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
121 Id. at 582. 
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of a New Jersey court in a product-liability action.”122  The defendant 
designed and manufactured the product to conform to U.S. specifications 
and engaged a distributor to market and distribute the machines to the 
entire U.S. market.
123
  Thus, the defendant J. McIntyre knew or should 
have known that its products would be sold and distributed to customers 
located in each of the United States, including New Jersey.
124
 
As in Asahi, all nine Supreme Court Justices agreed that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction was governed by the Due Process Clause, that the 
Due Process Clause required analysis of the defendant’s contact with the 
forum state, and that the defendant’s contact with the forum state was not 
relevant unless such contact was the result of the defendant’s purposeful 
availment of the forum state.
125
  The Supreme Court agreed on little else, 
however, as the Justices—reminiscent of Asahi—split into three groups.  In 
a 4-2-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction 
by New Jersey state courts over J. McIntyre was improper for an accident 
that occurred in New Jersey and injured a New Jersey resident.
126
  
V.  NICASTRO DOES NOT BREAK NEW GROUND 
A.  International Shoe Provides the Appropriate “Test” and Requires 
Purposeful Availment 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nicastro does not break much, if any, 
new ground.  None of the Justices suggested that any of the Supreme 
Court’s existing personal jurisdiction precedent should be overturned.  All 
nine Justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was governed 
by the Due Process Clause and that the International Shoe test provided the 
appropriate analysis.  All nine Justices analyzed the defendant’s contact 
with the forum state and agreed that the contact was not relevant unless 
such contact was the result of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the 
forum state. 
B.  The Result in Nicastro Is Consistent with the Court’s Prior Precedent 
Although there was significant disagreement about the application of 
                                                                                                                          
122 Id. at 589. 
123 Id. at 579–80. 
124 Id. at 577, 592–93. 
125 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87, 2790–91 (2011) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 2791–93 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2796, 2798–99, 2801 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In another personal jurisdiction case, argued and decided on the same day as 
Nicastro, a unanimous Supreme Court stated: “A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes 
defendants to the State’s coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for compatibility with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
126 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
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the agreed-upon standard, the result in Nicastro is consistent with the 
Court’s prior precedent.127  Nicastro involved a single, isolated product that 
ended up in New Jersey.  The defendant made no sales in New Jersey, had 
no presence in New Jersey, had “no contacts with the state of New Jersey,” 
did not directly sell or solicit business in New Jersey, and “had no 
expectation that its product would be purchased and utilized in New 
Jersey.”128  Under the Court’s World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi 
decisions, the New Jersey court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant J. 
McIntyre.  There was only one contact with New Jersey and, although the 
contact was the basis for the action against the defendant, there was no 




The facts of Nicastro do not constitute purposeful availment pursuant 
to Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality.  The defendant did not target New 
Jersey (other than as one of the fifty States).  The sale of defendant’s 
product in New Jersey was between the plaintiff’s employer and the non-
party distributor and did not “come about by an action of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”130  As noted by Justice 
Breyer, there was “no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related 
design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else.”131     
The facts of Nicastro also do not constitute purposeful availment 
                                                                                                                          
127 See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he outcome of this case is determined by our 
precedents.”); id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would adhere strictly to our precedents and the 
limited facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court.”); In re Chinese Mfrs. Drywall Prods. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2012 WL 3815669, at *21 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence provides a clear directive to the Court to apply existing Supreme Court precedent on 
specific personal jurisdiction and the stream–of–commerce doctrine.”).  But see Drobak, supra note 8 
(“Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the opinions in Nicastro is the claim by the concurrence that they 
are doing ‘no more than adhering to our precedents.’” (footnote omitted)).  For an argument that 
purposeful availment should not be a constitutional requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over a non-U.S. defendant by a federal court, see generally Wendy Collins Perdue, Aliens, the Internet 
and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 455 (2004).  
128 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 579 (N.J. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
129 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–99 (1980).  But see Mike 
Richards, Purposeful Availment and Commercial Exploitation, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (Nov. 16, 
2011), http://www.nyujll.com/2011/11/purposeful-availment-and-commercial.html [hereinafter 
Richards, Purposeful Availment] (“Permitting New Jersey courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
J. McIntyre would have been entirely consistent with World-Wide Volkswagen.”); CLERMONT, supra 
note 24, § 4.2 at 224–25 (“The lower courts currently appear to be split, but they do seem to be moving 
toward a new consensus that only slightly shortens the prior jurisdictional reach down the stream of 
commerce.  More decisions, and the better ones, hold that an in-state purchase gives the state power 
over a nondirect seller with an actual awareness of its products’ being regularly sold there, and that 
such personal jurisdiction normally will not be unreasonable.”). 
130 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
131 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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pursuant to Justice Brennan’s Asahi plurality.  This was a single, isolated 
product that ended up in New Jersey, rather than a “‘regular . . . flow’ or 
‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey.”132  Purposeful availment was 
lacking because defendant’s product was not regularly sold in the forum 
state through a chain of distribution.
133
 
The facts of Nicastro also do not constitute purposeful availment 
pursuant to Justice Stevens’s Asahi concurrence.  For Justice Stevens, 
“[w]hether or not [the defendant’s] conduct rises to the level of purposeful 
availment requires a constitutional determination that is affected by the 
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the [defendant’s 
products].”134  J. McIntyre produced a single product that ended up in New 
Jersey.  By contrast, Asahi had engaged in a “higher quantum of conduct” 
as part of “a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over 
100,000 units annually over a period of several years.”135   This activity 




In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg correctly pointed out the distinct 
character of the product at issue—a $24,900 shearing machine used to 
process recyclable metals.  Justice Ginsberg stated: 
[J. McIntyre’s] machine . . . is unlikely to sell in bulk 
worldwide, much less in any given State.  By dollar value, 
the price of a single machine represents a significant sale.  
Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of 
flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the 




Although the machine was expensive, it was a single product rather 
than a regular course of dealing.  This would be a departure from the 
Court’s prior precedent.  The Court rejected jurisdiction in World-Wide 
Volkswagen—a case involving a single automobile—despite the fact that 
automobiles are significant purchases that are priced comparably to the 
$25,000 shearing machine in Nicastro.
138
 
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the defendant foreign automobile 
manufacturer in World-Wide Volkswagen—Audi—was subject to 
                                                                                                                          
132 Id.  
133 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119–20 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
134 Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
138 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298–99 (noting that the 
defendants derived “substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma” but rejecting the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction). 
 2012] THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 63 
jurisdiction and, therefore, the defendant J. McIntyre should be subject to 
the New Jersey court’s jurisdiction in Nicastro.139  Unlike J. McIntyre, 
however, Audi did not object to jurisdiction.
140
  Furthermore, Audi was 
selling thousands of automobiles throughout the United States, and 
Volkswagen (which owned Audi) operated “an extensive chain of 
Volkswagen service centers throughout the country, including some in 
Oklahoma.”141  Thus, Audi was in a significantly different, and worse, 
position than J. McIntyre.  Even under Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality 
opinion, Audi purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma by intentionally 
directing its conduct there through sales, marketing, and services offered to 
Oklahoma residents. 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence noted that “[t]he Supreme Court of New 
Jersey adopted a broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction 
based on its view that ‘[t]he increasingly fast-paced globalization of the 
world economy has removed national borders as barriers to trade.’”142  
Justice Breyer determined, however, that the facts of the case did not 
require the Court to consider changes to communications and international 
commerce in order to resolve the dispute.  He therefore concluded that the 
outcome was determined by application of the Court’s existing 
precedent.
143
  In particular, the defendant did not make any sales to New 
Jersey and made only one sale to its distributor that ended up in New 
Jersey.  Justice Breyer cited World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition 
that “a single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a 
different State (where the accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis for 
asserting jurisdiction.”144  He further cited the separate opinions in Asahi as 
“strongly suggest[ing] that a single sale of a product in a State does not 
constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of 
                                                                                                                          
139 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg did acknowledge, 
however, that the Court had never “considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern presented 
here—a foreign country manufacturer enlisting a U.S. distributor to develop a market in the United 
States for the manufacturer’s products.”  Id. at 2802.  
140 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288 n.3 (1980). 
141 Id. at 298–99. 
142 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., 
Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010)). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 2792.  Professor Steinman appropriately notes that “Justice Breyer does not acknowledge 
a significant tension between his ‘single sale’ idea and the Court’s decision in McGee v. Int’l Life 
Insurance Co.”  Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 508 (2012).  Unlike the insurer in McGee, 
who dealt directly with the insured in selling a life insurance policy, the U.K. manufacturer retained a 
U.S. distributor.  Thus, McGee is distinguishable, but the distinction is unsatisfying given Justice 
Breyer’s analysis. 
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commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take place.”145 
Justice Breyer expressed a willingness to consider a change in personal 
jurisdiction law based on “relevant contemporary commercial 
circumstances.”146  But Nicastro did not present such circumstances and 
the result fit within existing precedent. 
VI.  NICASTRO’S INSIGHT ON THE CURRENT JUSTICES’ VIEWS ON 
PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT  
A.  Justice Kennedy’s Restrictive View of Purposeful Availment 
1.  Federalism Concerns Require Proof of Submission to Sovereign 
Authority 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro is curious because he purported 
to stay within the bounds of existing personal jurisdiction doctrine and 
precedent, but a close look reveals that he sought to revisit (and shift) the 
foundation of personal jurisdiction theory.  Justice Kennedy began his 
opinion by recognizing that Due Process is an “individual[] right.”147   
Justice Kennedy also approved the basic International Shoe test
148
 and he 
reaffirmed the requirement that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
must result from purposeful availment.
149
  There is nothing new or 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id.  Professor Allan Ides argues that Justice Breyer got it wrong when he concluded that J. 
McIntyre fit within existing precedent.  Ides, supra note 8, at 371–76.  In particular he argues that 
Justice Breyer’s conclusion is correct “only if adhering to precedents means revising those precedents 
to fit the conclusion.”  Id. at 376.  Yet, Professor Ides’s conclusion is based on a disagreement about 
how to read, interpret, and extend the three Asahi opinions to this new factual circumstance.  See id. at 
375 (“Justice Breyer simply and simplistically assumes that the language used by Justice Brennan to 
describe the flow of products is freely transferrable to the sale of heavy industrial machinery.”).  And 
Professor Ides concedes that Justice Breyer’s argument is plausible.  See id. (“It is just as plausible to 
infer that Justice Stevens would uphold jurisdiction in a case involving the single sale (low volume) of 
an expensive (high value) and dangerous (hazardous character) piece of industrial equipment as it is to 
infer the opposite.”). 
146 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
147 Id. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion). 
148 See id. at 2787. 
149 See id. at 2790 (“These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not 
show that J.McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”); id. at 2785 (“As a general 
rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . .’”); id. at 2787 (“As a general rule, the 
sovereign’s exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . .’”); id. (“In products liability cases like 
this one, it is defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”); id. at 2789 (“Furthermore, were general fairness 
considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where 
carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the defendant’s interests, or where the 
plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum.”).  Justice Kennedy 
also affirms the basic principles of general jurisdiction and distinguishes general jurisdiction from the 
specific jurisdiction issue involved in Nicastro.  Id. at 2787. 
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controversial there. 
But early on Justice Kennedy made clear that he is not satisfied with 
existing personal jurisdiction theory and he does not believe that personal 
jurisdiction is, at its core, about individual rights or liberty.  Rather, in his 
view, personal jurisdiction is about federalism concerns—protecting and 
maintaining the states’ sovereign authority.  His opening discussion cited 
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania
150
 for the proposition that the “Due Process 
Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty or 
property only by the exercise of lawful power.”151  He then cited Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment
152
 as support for his contention that 
“[t]his is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve 
disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a 
sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”153 
Although both cases deal with issues of sovereign power, neither 
Giaccio nor Citizens for a Better Environment is a personal jurisdiction 
case.  Giaccio involved a Pennsylvania statute authorizing a jury to impose 
the cost of criminal prosecution on a defendant acquitted of a misdemeanor 
charge.
154
  The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Due 
Process Clause because of its vagueness and the absence of any standards 
sufficient to enable the defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary 
and discriminatory imposition of costs.
155
  Citizens for a Better 
Environment involved subject matter jurisdiction, not personal 
jurisdiction.
156
  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
and thus the Court never mentioned or considered the Due Process 
Clause.
157
  Justice Kennedy also cites Burnham v. Superior Court
158
 for the 
proposition that “neither statute nor judicial decree may bind strangers to 
the State.”159  Burnham, however, is a case in which jurisdiction was valid 
because the defendant was effectively served with process while physically 
present in the forum state.
160
 
These cases tell us nothing about the application of the personal 
                                                                                                                          
150 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 
151 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (emphasis added). 
152 523 U.S. 83 (1988). 
153 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (emphases added). 
154 Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402.    
155 Id. 
156 Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
157 Id. 
158 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
159 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787; see also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608–09 (stating that the 
“proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void” could traditionally be “embodied 
in the phrase coram non judice, ‘before a person not a judge’—meaning, in effect, that the proceeding 
in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could 
therefore not yield a judgment”). 
160 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610. 
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jurisdiction right pursuant to the Due Process Clause, but they do tell us 
something about Justice Kennedy’s views on the foundation of the 
personal jurisdiction right.  In describing the foundation of a challenge to 
personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy neither cited nor discussed the 
Supreme Court’s 1985 statement in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz161 that 
“[a]lthough this protection [of an individual’s liberty interest] operates to 
restrict state power, ‘it must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,’ rather 
than as a function ‘of federalism concerns.’”162 
Justice Kennedy later reiterated that Due Process is an “individual” 
right and paid lip service to the Court’s prior statement in Insurance Co. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites that “[t]he personal jurisdiction 
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.  It 
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but 
as a matter of individual liberty.”163  But, as characterized by Professor 
Patrick Borchers, Justice Kennedy nevertheless proceeded with “a bull-
headed attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in a sovereignty theory”164 
rather than in an individual liberty theory.  Exemplifying this viewpoint, 
Justice Kennedy opined: 
Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not 
as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual 
liberty,” for due process protects the individual’s right to be 
subject only to lawful power.  But whether a judicial 
judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has 
authority to render it.
165
 
For Justice Kennedy, it is not “individual liberty,” but instead “sovereign 
authority” that is the “central concept” of Due Process in the context of 
personal jurisdiction.
166
  Furthermore, “jurisdiction is in the first instance a 
question of authority rather than fairness.”167 
Justice Kennedy provided some insight into his definition of 
purposeful availment by assessing the O’Connor and Brennan plurality 
opinions in Asahi.  Justice Kennedy characterized Justice Brennan’s Asahi 
                                                                                                                          
161 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
162 Id. at 472 n.13 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S 
694, 702–03 n.10 (1982)). 
163 Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702.  Compagnie Des Bauxites was a decision in which 
all nine Justices agreed on the result, eight Justices signed on to the Majority opinion, and one Justice 
concurred separately. 
164 Borchers, supra note 8, at 1263. 
165 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
166 Id. at 2788–89; cf. Perdue, supra note 127, at 458 (“The view that personal jurisdiction 
involves an allocation of sovereign authority is also consistent with how personal jurisdiction is 
approached internationally.”). 
167 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
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concurrence as “advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and 
foreseeability.”168  This is a plain mischaracterization of Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Asahi.
169
  Justice Brennan and seven other Justices 
acknowledged and agreed that it would be unfair to subject Asahi to 
jurisdiction in California.  Justice Brennan wrote separately to argue that 
Asahi, by its actions, purposefully availed itself of the California market 
and had engaged in sufficient minimum contacts.
170
  He did not need to 
write separately about fairness.  Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected Justice 
Brennan’s Asahi concurrence because—as he mischaracterizes—it “is 
inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.  This Court’s 
precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his 
expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”171 
By contrast, Justice Kennedy agreed with the purposeful availment 
approach in Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality opinion, which focuses on 
whether a defendant’s activities demonstrate “an intent or purpose to serve 
the market in the forum State.”172  There, Justice O’Connor explains that 
“[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of 
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the 
forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have 
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”173 
But Justice Kennedy was not satisfied with simply approving Justice 
O’Connor’s Asahi statement of purposeful availment because it did not go 
far enough for him.
174
  He wanted the Court to adopt a more rigorous 
approach to purposeful availment that would require a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that “the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit 
to the power of a sovereign.”175  For Justice Kennedy, the determination of 
                                                                                                                          
168 Id.; see also id. at 2788 (“[T]he opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.”). 
169 In earlier opinions, Justice Brenan had advocated an approach under which all of the 
International Shoe factors, including the defendant’s contacts with the forum, were assessed “under a 
general rubric of fairness.”  FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 79–80 (describing the “Fairness Factors” 
extrapolated from the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence).    
170 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 116, 121 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (explaining the reasoning for why Asahi had established sufficient minimum contacts in 
California). 
171 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789; see also id. at 2790 (noting the “undesirable consequences of 
Justice Brennan’s approach”). 
172 See id. at 2790 (“[T]he authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful 
availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi.”); id. (“Respondent has not established 
that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.”). 
173 Id. at 2788. 
174 See id. at 2790 (“The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends 
on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi, does not by itself 
resolve many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases.”). 
175 Id. at 2788; see also id. at 2791 (“Due process protects petitioner’s right to be subject only to 
lawful authority.  At no time did petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent 
to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.  New Jersey is without power to adjudge the rights 
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“whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the 
power of a sovereign” is the “principal inquiry” in a specific jurisdiction 
case.
176
  Due Process protects the defendant from improper exercise of 
state power, unless the defendant has submitted to that power.  Justice 
Kennedy concluded that New Jersey lacked jurisdiction because J. 
McIntyre did not “engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal[ed] an 
intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.”177 
2.  Application of Justice Kennedy’s New Purposeful Availment 
Standard 
Justice Kennedy did not offer any specifics on what evidence would 
satisfy his requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate that a defendant’s 
activities manifested an intention to submit to the power of the forum state.  
We do know, however, that the issue will only arise when the defendant 
has not expressly consented to submit to the power of a sovereign either 
during the course of the litigation or prior to litigation by ex ante 
agreement and the defendant also has not waived or forfeited the objection 
to jurisdiction during litigation.  In such case, the plaintiff must therefore 
use evidence of the defendant’s activities in or affecting the forum state in 
order to establish the defendant’s implied, but intentional, submission to 
the forum state’s authority. 
This sounds a lot like the International Shoe test, which focuses on a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.178  But Justice Kennedy added a 
new, heightened requirement of purposeful availment to prove before one 
can consider the “fairness” of the exercise of personal jurisdiction.179  
Purposeful availment exists where the defendant, by its actions within or 
directed toward the forum state, “invok[es] the benefits and protections of 
[the forum States’] laws.”180  Where it is proper to “infer an intention to 
benefit from” the laws of the forum state, it is proper to infer “an intention 
to submit to the laws of the forum State.”181  Likewise, where the 
                                                                                                                          
and liabilities of J. McIntyre, and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.”); id. at 2787 
(setting forth examples of presence, citizenship, domicile, incorporation location of principal place of 
business “from which it is proper to infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to 
the laws of the forum State”). 
176 Id. at 2788; see also id. (asserting that “submission” to sovereign authority occurs “through 
contact with and activity directed at a sovereign”). 
177 Id. at 2791. 
178 See id. at 2787 (“A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the sovereign such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945))). 
179 See id. (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot 
transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law.”). 
180 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
181 Id. 
 2012] THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 69 
defendant’s activities “reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the 
protection of” the forum state’s laws, it is proper to infer an intent to 
submit to the forum state’s sovereign authority.182 
Thus, Justice Kennedy would raise the bar for purposeful availment.  
Purposeful availment does not simply “ensure[] that a defendant will not 
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous or 
attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third 
person.”183  Instead, a defendant’s activities must manifest an intent to 
submit to sovereign authority.
184
  And although Justice Kennedy focused 
on a defendant’s intentions, he would not permit courts to consider a 
defendant’s expectations when determining the defendant’s intention.185 
If Justice Kennedy’s analysis were adopted, it would essentially grant 
complete immunity to component part manufacturers.  It also would grant 
immunity to end product manufacturers who hire a middle man distributor 
to complete actual sales to individual states.  By building in this layer of 
protection through its actions, end product manufacturers would be 
evidencing their intention not to submit to a state’s sovereign power 
despite their certain intent to make sales in the forum state. 
Justice Kennedy would raise the bar for purposeful availment, thereby 
minimizing the number of cases in which the state courts will have 
personal jurisdiction.  But he also sought to eliminate the balancing test for 
fairness by making it redundant: “In products-liability cases like this one, it 
is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent 
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”186  For Justice 
Kennedy, if there is purposeful availment because a defendant has 
manifested an intention to submit to the forum state’s sovereign authority, 
it cannot offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for 
the forum state’s court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.  Just to 
be clear, Justice Kennedy would greatly restrict the number of cases for 
which there is purposeful availment by requiring the plaintiff to prove that 
the defendant intended to submit to the power of the forum state.  Because 
Justice Kennedy would raise the bar so high for establishing personal 
jurisdiction, he can safely eliminate as redundant the fairness inquiry of 
whether jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
Finally, in a fitting bit of irony, Justice Kennedy opined that the Court 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. at 2791. 
183 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
184 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
185 Id. at 2789 (“[I]t is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts 
to subject him to judgment.”). 
186 Id. at 2787 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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should fashion clear jurisdictional rules “whenever possible” in order to 
avoid the “significant expenses [that] are incurred just on the preliminary 
issue of jurisdiction.”187  Even so, he asserted that the development and 
clarification of the principle of purposeful availment will occur on a case-
by-case basis “in common-law fashion.”188 
3.  Back to the Future for Justice Kennedy? 
As Justice Ginsburg alluded to in her dissent, several of the concepts 
put forth by Justice Kennedy have already been considered and rejected by 
the Supreme Court in its earlier personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
189
  In 
attempting to identify the origins and constitutional foundation of personal 
jurisdiction, the Court and commentators alike have debated whether the 
primary concern of personal jurisdiction is the protection of state 




But the Supreme Court has previously concluded that the restrictions 
on the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents is 
“ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the 
Due Process Clause” because “[t]hat Clause is the only source of the 
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention 
of federalism concerns.”191  
Likewise, Justice Kennedy posits that the crucial inquiry in a specific 
jurisdiction case is “whether the defendant’s activities manifest an 
                                                                                                                          
187 Id. at 2790. 
188 Id.; see also id. at 2789 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-
sovereign, analysis.”). 
189 Id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality’s notion that consent is the 
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.”); see also Borchers, 
supra note 8, at 1246 (stating that Justice Kennedy’s “plurality opinion attempted to roll back the clock 
by a century or more and re-ground personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty theory that the Court 
had apparently rejected several times before”). 
190 See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 6–7 (2010) (examining how 
“[l]iberty is a relational concept, and one cannot fully understand the relationship between a state and 
citizens of other states without understanding the web of relationships between individuals, states, and 
the national government”); Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 853–54 (1989) (discussing how the “Supreme Court began to develop the 
principles of federal law that would restrict state judicial power over noncitizens”). 
 191 Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 
(1982); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985) (“The Due Process Clause 
protects an individual’s liberty interest.”); id. at 472 n.13 (“Although this protection [of an individual’s 
liberty interest] operates to restrict state power, it ‘must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,’ rather than as a function ‘of federalism 
concerns.’” (quoting Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 702–03 n.10)); Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States . . . 
 [is not] . . . the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”).  But see Perdue, supra note 
127, at 458 (“The role of jurisdiction as a doctrine for allocating power among sovereigns has been 
obscured by the Court’s focus on the Due Process Clause . . . .”). 
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intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”192  Justice Kennedy 
acknowledges that specific jurisdiction cases arise “despite [a defendant] 
not having consented to the exercise of jurisdiction.”193  Thus, this inquiry 
sounds remarkably similar to “the long-discredited fiction of implied 
consent.”194  Justice Ginsburg points out that the Supreme Court long ago 
rejected the concept of implied consent as the basis for personal 
jurisdiction.
195
   
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s focus on submission to sovereign authority 
raises the specter that the Court would be forced to revisit its jurisprudence 
regarding choice of law issues.
196
  Justice Kennedy in fact ties the two 
concepts together when he writes that the Due Process Clause protects 
individuals against the unlawful exercise of power both “with respect to 
the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process [and] 
with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for 
those within its sphere.”197  A sovereign’s legislative authority to regulate 
the conduct of a nonresident is surely as important to the defendant as its 
authority to exercise jurisdiction over that nonresident defendant.
198
  And 
the Court’s decisions currently provide that a state may apply its law even 
                                                                                                                          
192 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion); see also id. (stating that “submission” to 
sovereign authority occurs “through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign”). 
193 Id. at 2785.  
194 Id. at 2799 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Borchers, supra note 8, at 1264 (“Rather 
than attempting to recast minimum contacts as a proxy for state sovereignty, it would have been more 
intellectually honest if the plurality had said that it hoped to overrule International Shoe and return U.S. 
jurisdiction to Pennoyer-era notions of sovereignty and consent.”).  But see Transgrud, supra note 190, 
at 890 (arguing that the personal jurisdiction inquiry should focus on political “consent”).   
195 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
196 See Borchers, supra note 8, at 1269 (“To some extent, choice of law sits in the corner of the 
Supreme Court’s minimum contacts cases like the uninvited and brooding party guest.”); Arthur T. von 
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1121, 1130 (1966) (“Current American thinking respecting both adjudicatory jurisdiction and 
recognition of foreign judgments has placed little emphasis on choice-of-law considerations; either the 
problem is ignored or it is assumed that the concerns of the various interested communities in the 
underlying situation are adequately recognized and adjusted through choice of law.”). 
197 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
198 See Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 
960, 960–62 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague regarding 
the choice of law); James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 
873–75 (1980) (calling for a reevaluation of personal jurisdiction over defendants through unrelated 
minimum contacts within the venue state); Courtland H. Peterson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
Revisited, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 37–40 (1988) (evaluating the effects of the Allstate decision on 
personal jurisdiction); Robert Allen Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The 
Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031, 1032–34 (1978) (discussing the 
appropriate exercise of a state's personal jurisdiction on a defendant); Louise Weinberg, The Place of 
Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 100–02 
(1988) (considering the constitutional questions of personal jurisdiction in relation to state law and 
foreign defendants). 
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though it lacks personal jurisdiction, and vice versa.
199
 
B.  Justice Ginsburg’s View of Purposeful Availment 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reaffirms the International Shoe test and the 
Court’s prior specific jurisdiction doctrine.200  She urges that application of 
International Shoe and its progeny should “unequivocally” lead to a 
finding of jurisdiction.
201
  Yet, she acknowledges that the Court has never 
considered a fact pattern like that in Nicastro—a foreign defendant end 
product manufacturer who retains a U.S. distributor to market and sell the 
manufacturer’s product throughout the fifty States.202  Thus, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent is premised upon a new concept—a defendant that 
seeks to develop a market for its products everywhere in the United States 
has purposefully availed itself of each of the individual states in which the 
manufacturer’s product is sold. 
Justice Ginsburg highlighted facts that were disclosed during discovery 
that confirmed that the defendant J. McIntyre had hired McIntyre America 
as its exclusive U.S. distributor with the express purpose of selling as many 
of the defendant’s products as possible “anywhere in” and “throughout” 
the United States.
203
  The Justice asked rhetorically:  
On what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory 
authority could the place of Nicastro’s injury within the 
United States be deemed off limits for his products liability 
claim against a foreign manufacturer who targeted the United 
States (including all the States that constitute the Nation) as 
the territory it sought to develop?
204
 
                                                                                                                          
199 Compare Phillipps Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805–06 (1985) (holding that the 
defendant utility company had standing to assert that Kansas lacked personal jurisdiction in a class 
action suit against it), with Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977) (holding that a shareholder 
cannot bring suit against a company's non-domiciled directors in the state of the company's domicile). 
200 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2804 (“While I 
dissent from the Court’s judgment, I take heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the Court, 
for that opinion would take a giant step away from the notions of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ 
underlying International Shoe.” (citations omitted)); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51, 2853–54 (2011) (reaffirming, in an unanimous opinion written by 
Justice Ginsburg, that the International Shoe test is appropriate for specific jurisdiction cases). 
201 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  But see id. at 2802 (acknowledging 
that “this Court has not considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern presented here—a 
foreign-country manufacturer enlisting a U.S. distributor to develop a market in the United States for 
the manufacturer’s products”). 
202 Id. at 2802. 
203 Id. at 2796–97. 
204 Id. at 2797.  Justice Ginsburg found this scenario so troubling that she mentioned it twice.  The 
first time she asked:  
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States for machines it 
manufactures.  It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to United 
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Justice Ginsburg concluded that the defendant had “purposefully 
availed itself” of the entire U.S. market and that, in similar circumstances, 




In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to 
promote and sell its machines in the United States, 
“purposefully availed itself” of the United States market 
nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete 
collection of States.  McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of 




Justice Ginsburg pointedly attacked Justice Kennedy’s view of 
personal jurisdiction theory and precedent.  She criticized Justice 
Kennedy’s conclusion that the defendant’s efforts to develop the U.S. as a 
nationwide market is not even relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.
207
  She 
also asserted that among “[a] few points on which there should be no 
genuine debate”208 is the recognition that “the constitutional limits on a 
state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due 
process, not state sovereignty.”209  Finally, Justice Ginsburg denounced 
Justice Kennedy’s “notion that consent is the animating concept” of 
personal jurisdiction as one entirely contrary to the Court’s prior 
precedent.
210
  Justice Ginsburg also stated that “a forum can exercise 
jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient; 
invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is 
unnecessary and unhelpful.”211 
                                                                                                                          
States purchasers.  Where in the United States buyers reside does not matter to this 
manufacturer.  Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can. It 
excludes no region or State from the market it wishes to reach.  But, all things 
considered, it prefers to avoid products liability litigation in the United States.  To 
that end, it engages a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside.  Has it 
succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is 
sold and causes injury or even death to a local user?  
Id. at 2794. 
205 Id. at 2801, app. at 2804–06. 
206 Id. at 2801. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 2797. 
209 Id. at 2798 (noting the contrast to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion which “assert[ed] that 
‘sovereign authority,’ not ‘fairness’ is the ‘central concept’ in determining personal jurisdiction”).    
210 Id. at 2798–99.  
211 Id. at 2799. 
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C.  Justice Breyer’s View of Purposeful Availment 
1.  All Three Asahi Approaches Appear Acceptable—and the Plaintiff 
Failed to Satisfy Any One of Them 
As previously discussed, Justice Breyer accepts the International Shoe 
test and his concurrence stays within the bounds of the Court’s prior 
personal jurisdiction decisions.
212
  He is unwilling to “abandon the 
heretofore accepted inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship 
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, it is fair, in light of 
defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit 
there.”213  For Justice Breyer, the Constitution demands both minimum 
contacts and purposeful availment, “each of which rests upon a particular 
notion of defendant-focused fairness.”214 
Justice Breyer explicitly rejects the reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s 
Nicastro plurality opinion: “The plurality seems to state strict rules that 
limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the 
power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be said to have targeted the forum.’ . . . I 
do not agree with the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule.”215 
Justice Breyer did not specifically address Justice Kennedy’s elevation 
of consent to sovereign authority as the “central concept” of Due Process 
in the context of personal jurisdiction.  But he nevertheless appears to 
reject that understanding.  He states that he agrees with Justice Kennedy on 
the outcome of the case, but he “concur[s] only in the judgment of that 
opinion and not its reasoning.”216  He implicitly rejects Justice Kennedy’s 
consent to sovereign authority approach by arguing that the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry focuses on fairness to the defendant.
217
 
Justice Breyer also explicitly rejects the approach to purposeful 
availment taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court and urged by the 
plaintiff in Nicastro,
218
 stating: “Under that view, a producer is subject to 
jurisdiction for a products liability action so long as it ‘knows or 
reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a 
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold 
                                                                                                                          
212 See discussion supra Part V.B (discussing Justice Breyer’s opinion in Nicastro). 
213 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
214 Id. 
215 Id. (citations omitted). 
216 Id. at 2794. 
217 See id. at 2793 (“[C]onstitutional demand for ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposefu[l] 
avail[ment]’ each . . . rest upon a particular notion of defendant-focused fairness.”); id. (refusing to 
“abandon the heretofore accepted inquiry of whether . . . it is fair, in light of the defendant’s contacts 
with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit there”); id. at 2793–94 (demonstrating a concern for 
“basic fairness” and whether it would be “fundamentally unfair” to subject defendant to jurisdiction). 
218 Id. at 2793. 
 2012] THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 75 
in any of the fifty states.’”219  Awareness or foreseeability is not enough.220 
Although he concurs in the result with Justice Kennedy, nowhere does 
Justice Breyer reject the reasoning of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  Justice 
Breyer does agree with Justice Ginsburg that personal jurisdiction is 
premised upon considerations of fairness to the defendant.
221
  He also 
indicates a willingness to consider in a future case the contemporary 
commercial circumstances that were considered in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent.
222
  But he refused to consider them in Nicastro because the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction and the plaintiff in 
Nicastro failed to meet this burden.
223
 
Justice Breyer seemed inclined to accept each of the three Asahi 
approaches as a valid way for a plaintiff to establish purposeful availment 
by an end product manufacturer such as the defendant McIntyre: (1) 
Justice O’Connor’s approach, that is, proof of purposeful targeting of New 
Jersey customers or “special state-related design, advertising, advice, 
marketing, or anything else”; (2) Justice Brennan’s approach, that is, proof 
of a “regular and anticipated flow of products” to New Jersey for retail sale 
as part of an established distribution system; and (3) Justice Stevens’s 
approach, that is, proof of a “regular course of dealing” that involves a 
certain level of volume, value, or particularly hazardous goods.
224
 
2.  Modern Concerns May Shape Justice Breyer’s Take on Personal 
Jurisdiction Doctrine 
Although Justice Breyer reasoned that the outcome of Nicastro was 
determined by the Court’s existing precedent, he expressed an interest in 
quickly revisiting personal jurisdiction doctrine in a case with a fully 
                                                                                                                          
219 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592 
(2010)).  Although he explicitly rejects this reasoning, Justice Breyer limits his rejection to “the context 
of this case.”  Id.  Elsewhere, however, he notes that the Court has “strongly suggested” that 
foreseeability or awareness or even the hope that a product will end up in the forum State is not enough 
to constitute purposeful availment.  Id. at 2792. 
220 See id. at 2792 (“And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale 
of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and 
hoping) that such a sale will take place.”). 
221 See id. at 2793 (questioning whether “it is fair . . . to subject the defendant to suit there”); id. 
(“[T]he constitutional demand for ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposefu[l] avail[ment],’ each . . . rest 
upon a particular notion of defendant-focused fairness.”); id. at 2793–94 (demonstrating concern for 
“basic fairness of an absolute rule”); id. at 2794 (acknowledging that there is a question of 
“fundamental[] unfair[ness]”). 
222 Id. at 2791. 
223 Id. at 2792. 
224 Id.  Justice Breyer approves the Brennan approach to the extent that it includes a  
“regular . . . flow” or “regular course” of product sales in the forum State.  He does not approve the 
Brennan approach to the extent that it finds purposeful availment whenever the manufacturer is aware 
or can foresee that is product may end up in the forum State.  Id. 
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developed factual record regarding “contemporary commercial 
circumstances.”225  On that score, Justice Breyer stated: “Because the 
incident at issue in this case does not implicate modern concerns, and 
because the factual record leaves many open questions, this is an 
unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic 
jurisdictional rules.”226 
In particular, Justice Breyer expressed concerns over manufacturers 
who advertise, market, or sell products over the Internet or through an 
Internet-based retailer like Amazon.com.
227
  He also expressed concern 
about the effect of exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign 
manufacturers—especially those who distribute their products primarily 
through an Internet retailer such as Amazon.com—on foreign policy.228   
Justice Breyer is not the only Justice struggling to define the scope of 
the purposeful availment requirement and to assess its national and 
international impact.  At oral argument in Nicastro, Justices Kennedy, 
Scalia, and Roberts grappled with the relevant difference in treatment, if 
any, that should be afforded to a foreign manufacturer who simply makes a 
component part for a product that ends up in the United States as compared 
to that treatment afforded to an end product manufacturer.
229
  Justices 
Breyer, Scalia, Kagan, and Ginsburg also expressed concern over whether 
the United States is in line with other countries regarding the requirements 
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against U.S. 
companies, as compared to the purposeful availment requirement for a 
foreign manufacturer who is sued in the United States.
230
 
On the one hand, an expansive view of personal jurisdiction might lead 
foreign companies to refuse to do business in the United States.  On the 
other hand, a restrictive view of personal jurisdiction might lead U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
225 Id. at 2794. 
226 Id. at 2792–93. 
227 Id. at 2793.  
228 Justice Breyer questioned Benjamin J. Horwich, Assistant to the Solicitor General, in oral 
arguments: “[Y]ou’ve heard the [oral] arguments in [Nicastro].  I mean, it seemed that potentially can 
subject the smallest manufacturer to liability throughout the world because it uses the Internet. . . . I 
don’t know what the foreign policy—you’ve heard treaties discussed, et cetera.  Do you want to say 
anything?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 21:12–18, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1846 (2011) (No. 10-76); see also id. at 21:22–22:1 (“The . . . brief answer is that 
the Internet questions, in particular, are so complicated and, indeed, so potentially far-reaching that in a 
case that presented them, our interest might very well be different.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 
31:11–17, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (“[M]y problem 
is a sort of policy problem . . . I don’t see how the world’s going to work or develop if in fact every 
small business everywhere in the world has to know . . . the law of every 50 States and hire lawyers and 
come here, rather than making the accident victim go there.”). 
229 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46:24–51:21, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343).  
230 Id. at 33:12–36:20; see also Perdue, supra note 127, at 461–65 (observing that most countries 
do not require proof of purposeful availment). 
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companies to outsource business to foreign subsidiaries who—even in a 
case where the outsourced product is manufactured for a U.S. consumer 
who is subsequently injured by the product—will then be immune to 
litigation and judgment in U.S. state courts. 
VII.  PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT AND A DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO “SEVER 
ITS CONNECTION WITH” THE FORUM STATE  
Although Nicastro produced no majority opinion, the views expressed 
in the plurality opinions will guide state and federal trial courts in assessing 
objections to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants.  Identifying the holding of Nicastro requires lower courts to 
determine the “position taken by those [Justices] who concurred in the 
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds.”231  Based on Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, Nicastro reaffirms existing precedent and, for the most part, 
personal jurisdiction doctrine: 
 A majority of the Court rejects Justice Kennedy’s understanding of 
purposeful availment—that a defendant’s activities must manifest 
an intention to submit to sovereign authority.
232
   
 International Shoe provides the relevant test for specific 




 If a plaintiff can establish minimum contacts and purposeful 
availment, the court must determine whether it would nonetheless 
be unfair to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum 
state’s courts.234 
 A majority of the Court continues to reject the pure “Stream of 
Commerce” approach—there is no jurisdiction over a defendant 
manufacturer who sells its product to a consumer in State A who 
then takes the product to State B where the product causes injury 
to the consumer, even if the manufacturer is “aware” or “foresees” 
                                                                                                                          
231 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also id. (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976))); see generally Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980). 
232 See discussion supra Part VI.A (discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion regarding purposeful 
availment in relation to the majority opinion). 
233 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the applicability of the International Shoe test). 
234 E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 
2800–01, 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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that the product may enter State B.
235
 
Although the three opinions in Nicastro reveal agreement on several 
principles—including the shared view that purposeful availment is a 
requirement—they did not resolve the confusion regarding what constitutes 
purposeful availment.   
This Article identifies one simple organizing principle that must guide 
the Court in its quest to define and apply the purposeful availment 
requirement: no court should subject a nonresident defendant to personal 
jurisdiction for a contact with the forum state that the defendant cannot 
reasonably prevent.  Put another way, where it is not reasonably feasible 
for a defendant to sever its connection with the forum state, purposeful 
availment (and therefore specific jurisdiction) does not exist.  Conversely, 
where it is reasonably feasible for a defendant to sever its connection to a 
state but it has not done so, there is presumptively purposeful availment of 
that state and, subject to the fairness balancing, specific jurisdiction over 
the defendant. 
Justice White discussed this concept when writing for a six-person 
majority in World-Wide Volkswagen:   
When a corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum state . . . it has clear 
notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate 
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, 
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are 
too great, severing its connection with the State.
236
 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her opinion that J. McIntyre had, in fact, 
purchased such product liability insurance.
237
  She cited scholarship 
indicating that such insurance is both readily available and relatively 
cheap.
238
  Likewise, a manufacturer can easily pass the costs on to its 
consumers by raising prices.  Justice Breyer rightly pointed out, however, 
                                                                                                                          
235 See, e.g., id. at 2788 (plurality opinion); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
236 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citations omitted); see 
also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“It may be that a larger firm can readily 
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to 
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State. . . . But manufacturers 
come in many shapes and sizes.  It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small [business] . . . to 
respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 119 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
237 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
238 Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Drobak, supra note 8 (“People in business 
should buy liability insurance; that is just part of doing business.  Their insurance companies can 
defend suits more easily than injured victims can sue at the home of the defendant.”).  
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that the existence of insurance and the ability to raise prices may not be 
feasible for small-scale manufacturers who do not reasonably produce 
enough products to spread the costs of protecting against their risk: 
It may be that a larger firm can readily “alleviate the risk of 
burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the 
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, 
severing its connection with the State.”  But manufacturers 
come in many shapes and sizes.  It may be fundamentally 
unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian 
manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, 
selling its products through international distributors, to 
respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State 
in the United States, even those in respect to which the 
foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single 
(allegedly defective) good.  And a rule like the New Jersey 
Supreme Court suggests would require every product 
manufacturer, large or small, selling to American distributors 
to understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the 




Thus, the availability of insurance and the ability to spread risk 
through targeted price increases may be impractical for certain defendants 
and therefore it would be inappropriate to subject these defendants to 
personal jurisdiction in a distant forum.  Justice Breyer appears to ignore 
the answer to his own hypothetical—that the “unfairness” of exercising 
jurisdiction is limited by the inquiry into whether such exercise would 
“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”240 
But one course of conduct must be available to potential defendants of 
all sizes and types in order to subject them to jurisdiction in a foreign 
forum.  A nonresident economic actor must be able to pattern its conduct 
so as to sever its connection with that state.  A potential defendant must be 
able to structure its actions to avoid purposeful availment of a particular 
state if it wishes to avoid jurisdiction in that state.  This analysis is 
consistent with the notion that personal jurisdiction is an individual interest 
that is protected by the Due Process Clause.
241
  Existing precedent 
confirms that this interest may be waived or consented to both before 
litigation arises and after, and also may be forfeited by a careless defendant 
                                                                                                                          
239 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.  at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
240 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
241 See discussion supra Part I (discussing the interaction between personal jurisdiction and the 
Due Process Clause).  
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who fails to diligently assert this right.
242
  If the interest is truly an 
individual liberty interest then it must be applied so that nonresidents can 
reasonably structure their conduct so as to avoid purposeful availment and 
ultimately the power of the forum state’s courts.  As the Supreme Court 
stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, the purposeful availment requirement 
embodied in the Due Process Clause lends “a degree of predictability to the 
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and 
will not render them liable to suit.”243 
This principle explains the Court’s prior decisions: 
 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the New York dealership sold cars in 
New York.
244
  Once the car was sold in New York, the customer 
was free to take it to Oklahoma.  It was not possible for defendant 
to prevent customers from taking their cars to other states absent 
getting out of the business of car sales.  Because it was not 
reasonably feasible for the dealership to prevent the car from going 
to Oklahoma there was no purposeful availment.  This same 
reasoning applies to any product—even a product that is not 
“mobile by nature”245—placed in the stream of commerce.  Thus, 




 In Hanson v. Denckla,247 the Delaware corporate defendant 
established a trust in 1935 for Mrs. Donner, a Pennsylvania 
resident, and then acted as trustee.
248
  It was not reasonably 
feasible for the defendant to prevent Mrs. Donner from moving to 
Florida.  Therefore, the defendant did not purposefully avail itself 
                                                                                                                          
242 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (“In 
sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a 
defendant may be estopped from raising the issue.  These characteristics portray it for what it is—a 
legal right protecting the individual.”); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 
(1964) (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to 
permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”); Scott Dodson, 
Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1457–58 (2011) (“In its modern conception, 
personal jurisdiction ‘represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty but as a 
matter of individual liberty.’  Because of this basis, the requirement of personal jurisdiction can, like 
other personal rights, be waived, consented to, or forfeited.  It is even subject to estoppel principles 
imposed under the aegis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's sanctions provisions.” (citations 
omitted)). 
243 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
244 Id. at 289. 
245 In re Holiday Airline Corp., 620 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1980). 
246 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. 
247 357 U.S. 235 (1958) 
248 Id. at 238. 




 In McGee, the Court found purposeful availment and personal 
jurisdiction based on a single contact with the forum state.
250
  The 
defendant mailed a reinsurance certificate to an individual in 
California and entered into a policy of insurance with the 
California resident.
251
  The defendant could have severed—simply 
and effectively—its connection with California by refusing to mail 
any policies to California residents and by refusing to insure 
California residents. 
 In Asahi, the defendant Asahi manufactured tire valve assemblies 
in Japan and shipped them to Taiwan, where they were sold to 
Cheng Shin.
252
  Cheng Shin purchased tire valve assemblies from 
several other manufacturers as well as from Asahi.
253
  Cheng Shin 
incorporated the various tire valve assemblies in its finished tire 
tubes, which Cheng Shin sold throughout the world.
254
  One of 
Asahi’s tire valve assemblies was incorporated in a Cheng Shin 
tire tube, which was incorporated in a Honda Motorcycle, which 
was ultimately sold in California.  It was not reasonably feasible 
for Asahi to prevent the sale of the motorcycle in California and 
thereby to sever its connection with California.  The defendant 
“was a component-part manufacturer with ‘little control over the 
final destination of its products once they were delivered into the 
stream of commerce.’”255  It was an “easy” case for the Court to 
quickly decide that California did not have specific jurisdiction 
over Asahi.
256
  The individual Justices struggled, however, to 
determine whether there was purposeful availment.  When one 
considers that it was not reasonably feasible for Asahi to prevent 
its products from reaching California, it again becomes an easy 
case.  Absent additional conduct by Asahi directed toward 
                                                                                                                          
249 Id. at 252.  Today, a defendant might include a forum selection clause in the trust document in 
order to avoid having to litigate in Florida or any other disfavored forum.  When the Hanson trust was 
drafted in 1935, however, forum selection clauses were disfavored and presumptively unenforceable.  
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in 
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 595–99 (2007) (discussing the rise of contracts 
that modify litigation rules and courts’ initial resistance to enforcing them). 
250 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding that the suit was based on 
a contract which had substantial connection with the forum state of California). 
251 Id. at 221–22. 
252 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Uberti v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361 (Ariz. 1995)). 
256 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (plurality opinion). 
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California, there can be no purposeful availment.
257
 
The one case that does not fit the pattern as easily is Nicastro.  In 
Nicastro, the defendant was an end product manufacturer who sold its 
product to a distributor who then resold the product in New Jersey.
258
  The 
product injured a New Jersey resident in New Jersey.
259
  As an end product 
manufacturer, the defendant had significantly more control over the point 
of sale of its product than a component parts manufacturer.
260
  This ability 
to control its destiny included the ability to prevent the sale of its product 
in New Jersey by restricting the approved sales regions of its sole 




As will be shown below, I believe that Nicastro will be short-lived.  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, refused to join Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion “without a better understanding of the relevant contemporary 
commercial circumstances.”262  Instead he elected to wait for a case that 
permits “full consideration of the modern-day consequences” of the “many 
recent changes in commerce and communication.”263  When Justices 
Breyer and Alito confront such a case, they will likely conclude that an end 
product manufacturer who seeks to exploit all fifty States as a market has 
purposefully availed itself of each state in which its product is sold and is 
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction when the product injures a 
consumer in that state.  If an end product manufacturer wishes to “sever its 
connection with any particular state” in order to avoid being haled into that 
state’s courts, it is a simple matter to refrain from marketing its product in 
that state and to refuse to permit its product to be sold to consumers in that 
state. 
                                                                                                                          
257 Id. 
258 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
259 Id. 
260 See id. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Nicastro from Asahi, in which the 
defendant was a component parts manufacturer). 
261 Justice Breyer noted that the defendant in Nicastro did not engage in any additional conduct 
that would clearly support a finding of purposeful availment: purposeful targeting of New Jersey 
customers or “special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else”; a  
“regular . . . flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey”; or a regular course of dealing that involve a 
certain level of volume, value or particularly hazardous goods.  Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
262 Id. at 2794.  
263 Id. at 2791. 
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VIII.  PROPER APPLICATION OF THE PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
A.  Location of the Initial Sale, Service, or Conduct 
An economic actor controls the location of the initial sale of product, 
provision of a service, or other commercial conduct that might give rise to 
liability.  By initial sale, I mean the location of the initial transaction 
whereby the product is available to the public for purchase and passes to 
the hands of a consumer.  The consumer may be an individual or it may be 
a business—even a business that intends to resell the product.  The initial 
sale need not be the point at which the product leaves the hands of the 
manufacturer.  When a manufacturer hires a distributor who then 
distributes the product to a retailer, who in turn makes the product 
available to the public, the initial sale occurs at the location where the 
retailer sold the item to an individual consumer. 
It is a relatively simple matter for an Indiana manufacturer to avoid an 
initial sale in California: make all initial sales in Indiana, or refuse to make 
initial sales in California.
264
  If the Indiana manufacturer wishes to focus on 
manufacturing (rather than direct sales), it might hire a distributor.  The 
Indiana manufacturer can easily avoid California by requiring that its 
distributor(s) agree(s), as part of the distribution agreement, not to 
distribute the product to consumers or retailers in California.  Unlike 
litigation brought where the plaintiff resides, litigation brought in the state 
of original purchase allows the manufacturer to tailor prices so that 
purchasers in each state bear the costs of that court’s biases, thus removing 
the incentive for courts to be biased.
265
 
Likewise, an economic actor who resides in Indiana can limit the 
provision of services to Indiana or it can refuse to provide services in 
California and other states unfavorable to foreign defendants.  Finally, an 
individual or organization that resides in Indiana can limit its activities to 
the State of Indiana or it can refuse to travel to and conduct activity in 
California.  Thus, where an economic actor makes an initial sale in 
California, or provides services in California, or engages in commercial 
activity in California, there is presumptively purposeful availment of 
California for a lawsuit that arises from that conduct.
266
 
                                                                                                                          
264 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If 
[the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have 
been simple—it could have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania residents.”). 
265 Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Products Liability, 4 (USC Ctr. in Law, Econ. & 
Org., Research Paper No. C12-2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1987223. 
266 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Nicastro included an Appendix of lower court 
decisions that are consistent with the notion that “jurisdiction is appropriately exercised by courts of the 
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B.  Subsequent Movement to the Forum State 
Once the initial sale is made and the product leaves the manufacturer’s 
hands, is it possible for the manufacturer to prevent its movement to a 
particular state?  In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court confirmed that the 
manufacturer is not responsible for the unilateral actions of a consumer in 
taking the product to another state—even though the product was 
inherently mobile.
267
  The Court implicitly recognized that the New York 
dealership did not purposefully avail itself of Oklahoma because it was not 
reasonably feasible to prevent the contact with Oklahoma.
268
 
What steps could the New York dealer have taken to prevent the 
product from reaching Oklahoma?  It could (1) go out of business 
altogether; (2) get out of the business of selling cars; (3) refuse to sell to 
Oklahoma residents; or (4) require each purchaser to agree contractually 
that it will not take the product to Oklahoma and it will not permit the 
product to be taken to Oklahoma by a third party and it will not resell the 
product to anyone. 
1.  Go out of Business Altogether 
It is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of purposeful 
availment to conclude that the only effective way for a business to avoid 
purposeful availment of a particular state is to go out of business.  
Purposeful availment requires some intentional action by the defendant 
that “create[s] a substantial connection with the forum State.”269  
Establishing a business in New York is not an intentional act that creates a 
substantial connection with Oklahoma.  If an economic actor in New York 
possesses a product or service that people outside of New York covet, the 
purposeful availment requirement must be applied such that it is at the very 
least possible to deliver the product or service in New York while avoiding 
purposeful availment of Oklahoma. 
2.  Get out of the Business of Selling Cars 
Even if the New York dealership got out of the business of selling cars, 
any product it sold could be taken to Oklahoma through the stream of 
commerce.  World-Wide Volkswagen makes clear that purposeful 
availment of Oklahoma cannot be based on the simple act of selling a 
                                                                                                                          
place where the product was sold and caused injury” where a “local plaintiff [was] injured by the 
activity of a manufacturer seeking to exploit a multistate or global market.”  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 
2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Rather than discuss those cases, I refer the reader to the Appendix to 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. 
267 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). 
268 Id. at 297–99. 
269 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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product, even if the product is inherently mobile.
270
  Again, avoiding 
purposeful availment of a distant forum cannot require an individual or 
organization simply to avoid commerce altogether. 
3.  Refuse to Serve or Sell to Oklahoma Residents 
In order to avoid contact with Oklahoma, a provider of a service or a 
manufacturer of a product could refuse to conduct business with Oklahoma 
residents.  The first problem with this approach is its ineffectiveness in 
preventing the product from eventually reaching Oklahoma.  Refusing to 
sell products in New York to Oklahoma residents would not effectively 
prevent contact with Oklahoma because it would not prevent other (non-
Oklahoma) purchasers from taking the product to Oklahoma.  Nor would it 
effectively prevent resale of the product to an Oklahoma resident.  It also 
would be a simple matter for an Oklahoma resident to arrange for a straw 
man purchase by a non-Oklahoma purchaser.   
But even if the seller could not guarantee that no Oklahoman 
purchased a product, we might conclude that the seller had avoided 
purposeful availment of Oklahoma if it reasonably attempted to prevent 
sale to an Oklahoma resident but was thwarted by the unilateral furtive 
actions of the buyer.  Because the seller can reasonably and simply attempt 
to avoid sales to Oklahoma residents, should we require it to do so or be 
subject to a finding of purposeful availment of Oklahoma based on a single 
sale of a product in New York to an Oklahoma resident who later took the 
product to Oklahoma where it caused injury? 
Consider how this attempt to prevent contact with a particular state 
would work in practice.  The seller (or provider of a service) could post a 
sign on the front of their New York business that states “Oklahomans not 
welcome” or “We refuse to serve [or sell to] Oklahoma residents.”  The 
host at a restaurant would have to inquire of each customer, “You are not a 
resident of Oklahoma, are you?”271   
If this seems a bit bizarre, compare such a requirement with Internet 
retailers who identify the location of their customers to ensure that they do 
not sell goods or services that are prohibited or restricted in particular 
states.
272
  As discussed below, however, Internet sales are different because 
they involve a purchaser who has not traveled to the state where the 
manufacturer makes authorized sales, but instead has remained in the 
                                                                                                                          
270 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–99. 
271 A New York dealership could seek to avoid being haled into Oklahoma’s courts for litigation 
involving an injury to an Oklahoma purchaser by requiring the execution of a purchase agreement with 
a forum selection clause requiring all disputes to be litigated in New York.  But such an outcome does 
not address or protect against injuries to third parties (non-purchaser passengers, for example) that 
occur in Oklahoma. 
272 See discussion infra Part VIII.E. 
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disfavored state.
273
  Sales that occur in New York but are made to residents 
of Oklahoma do not involve purposeful availment of the State of 
Oklahoma; they involve purposeful availment of the State of New York, 
which happens to have some transient Oklahoma residents within its 
borders. 
Ultimately, adoption of a rule that would require a manufacturer that 
sells its product in New York to attempt to refuse to sell to Oklahoma 
residents would require economic actors to engage in discrimination 
against the residents of disfavored states.  Such a rule should be rejected 
because it conflicts with other constitutional principles, including freedom 
against restraints on interstate commerce and the rights of citizens of one 
state to travel freely to other states.
274
   
4.  Require the Purchaser to Make Contractual Agreements to Limit 
Contacts  
In order to avoid contact with Oklahoma, the New York dealership 
could require each purchaser to execute a purchase agreement whereby the 
purchaser agree not to take the product to Oklahoma, not to allow the 
product to be taken to Oklahoma by a third party, and not to resell the 
product.   Does the Due Process Clause require the dealer to make such 
efforts or risk a finding of purposeful availment?  Again, the car dealership 
in World-Wide Volkswagen did not attempt to do so, yet the Court found 
that there was no purposeful availment.   
Furthermore, such contractual provisions are highly suspect and might 
be unenforceable.  In general, contractual provisions that eliminate or 
restrict the post-sale use or resale of property are void as contrary to public 
policy favoring the free movement of property in commerce.
275
  More than 
one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated: 
But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it 
does not follow in case of sales actually made he may impose 
upon purchasers every sort of restriction.  Thus, a general 
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid.  The right of 
alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of 
general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation 
                                                                                                                          
273 See id.  
274 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
275 See John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907) (stating that such 
restrictions “offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3–4 (1981) (discussing restraints on alienation); 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 981 (1928) (discussing 
that restraint on alienation of property is disfavored and generally void because it restricts the free 
movement of property in commerce).   
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have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, 
which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such 
things as pass from hand to hand.  General restraint in the 
alienation of articles, things, chattels, except when a very 
special kind of property is involved, such as a slave or an 
heirloom, have been generally held void.
276
 
Economic actors have control over the state or states where an initial, 
authorized sale takes place or a service is provided.  By contrast, economic 
actors lack the ability to restrict the movement, use, or resale of their 
products or services.  Attempts to control the post-sale movement, use, and 
resale of products and services are likely to be ineffective and of dubious 
legality.  Therefore, post-sale activity that results in contact with another 
state should not constitute purposeful availment of that state. 
C.  Component Part Manufacturers 
A component part manufacturer does not sell its product directly to 
consumers in a particular state, but instead sells the component part to 
another manufacturer (end product or component-part) who incorporates 
the component part into an end product.
277
  The end product manufacturer 
then controls the system of distribution and the location of the initial sale 




 it is a simple 
matter for the end product manufacturer to prevent the initial sale of a 
product to consumers/end users in a particular state.  
Based on the limited ability of a component part manufacturer to 
control the location of the initial sale of the end product, it is not 
reasonably feasible for a component part manufacturer to sever its 
connection with a particular state.
280
  Thus, absent some additional conduct 
                                                                                                                          
276 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Furthermore, these contractual provisions would be ineffective absent court action to 
enforce them.  See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948) (refusing to enforce contract between 
private parties which contained a racially restrictive covenant); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.3 (3d ed. 1999) 
(examining the cases relating to the state commandment or state encouragement of private activities).  
This state action to enforce contractual provisions that discriminate against residents of a certain state 
might raise Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.  See id. § 11.9 (discussing state statutes burdening 
the exportation of local products). 
277 See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766–67 (Ill. 1961) 
(applying the stream of commerce theory to assert jurisdiction over a component part manufacturer that 
sold no components directly in Illinois, but did sell them to a manufacturer who incorporated them into 
a final product that was sold in Illinois). 
278 See discussion supra Part VIII.A. 
279 See discussion infra Part VIII.D. 
280 A component part manufacturer purposefully avails itself of a particular state—for example, 
Oklahoma—where the component part manufacturer sells its component part directly to consumers in 
Oklahoma or to distributors or retailers who then make the product available to the public in Oklahoma.  
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on the part of a New York component part manufacturer, there is no 
purposeful availment of Oklahoma when its product is incorporated in an 
end product that is later sold in Oklahoma and causes injury there. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi is consistent with this 
conclusion.  Although Asahi resulted in three separate opinions regarding 
purposeful availment and none garnered a majority of the Justices, a 
majority of the Court agreed that defendant Asahi did not purposefully 
avail itself of California simply by selling its component parts to Cheng 
Shin.
281
  Justices O’Connor’s and Stevens’s opinions both required some 
additional facts to support a finding of purposeful availment.
282
 
Furthermore, the additional conduct that gives rise to purposeful 
availment by the component part manufacturer must include conduct 
indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market as described by Justice 
O’Connor in her Asahi plurality opinion.  This type of conduct—such as 
advertising in the state, providing customer service in the state, or 
designing the product for the state—is entirely under the control of the 
component part manufacturer.  If the component part manufacturer wishes 
to sever its connection to the state, it can readily do so by refusing to 
engage in such conduct. 
By contrast, the additional conduct identified in Justices Stevens’s and 
Brennan’s Asahi concurrences—proof of a regular course of dealing that 
involves a certain level of volume, value, or particularly hazardous 
goods—is not within the control of the component part manufacturer.283  
Defendant Asahi did not control whether its tire valve assembly ended up 
in a tire on a safe and inexpensive tricycle sold in Australia or on a 
dangerous and expensive motorcycle sold in California.
284
  
A component part manufacturer can take action to increase the 
likelihood that its product will end up in Oklahoma.  If it makes the best 
component part in the world, the volume of sales of its product will 
increase along with the probability that the product will end up in 
                                                                                                                          
A component part manufacturer also will have purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma if it sells its 
component part to an end product manufacturer who is located in Oklahoma. 
281 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112–13 (1987). 
282 Id. at 112 (finding that there was no “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant . . . [indicating] an 
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State”); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting 
that defendant Asahi engaged in a “higher quantum of conduct” that included a “regular course of 
dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years”).  
Justice Brennan noted that there was a “regular flow” of product through established channels of 
distribution but he would have found purposeful availment based on a pure stream of commerce theory.  
Id. at 117; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 307 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (discussing how state highway programs contribute to the value of automobile 
dealerships’ business, and that these contacts are sufficient enough to require such a business to submit 
to a state’s jurisdiction). 
283 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22.   
284 Id. at 112–13. 
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Oklahoma.  Consider the following hypothetical:   
Hoosier, Inc. makes a widget.  The widget is a component 
part in various cellular phones.  Hoosier does no advertising 
and it has no website.  In order to purchase a widget (not yet 
installed in a phone), one must go to the “Hoosier Store,” 
located in the back of the Hoosier factory in Bloomington, 
Indiana.  Brad Pitt gets a Hoosier widget installed in his 
phone.  He falls in love with it.  He goes on The Ellen 
DeGeneres Show and jumps up and down on a couch 
screaming “I love this Hoosier Widget.”  Motorobo, an 
Illinois corporation that manufactures cell phones and sells 
them in ten Midwestern states, sends its purchasing agents to 
the Hoosier Store and places an order for $5 million worth of 
widgets for each of the next five years.  Motorobo arranges to 
pick up the widgets in Bloomington.  Motorobo incorporates 
the Hoosier widget in its latest line of phones.  Sales are 
strong, especially in Brad Pitt’s birthplace, Oklahoma.  For 
each of three consecutive years, Motorobo sells phones 
containing more than $1 million worth of Hoosier widgets in 
Oklahoma.  
Has Hoosier, Inc. purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma if there is a 
lawsuit claiming a phone purchased in Oklahoma contained a defective 
widget?  If a regular course of conduct or a quantum of sales can establish 
purposeful availment, then the answer must be yes.  And it remains so 
despite the fact that Hoosier, Inc. cannot reasonably “sever its connection 
with Oklahoma.”  Sales are high because Hoosier, Inc. makes widgets that 
are high quality and popular.  If it made lesser quality widgets, they would 
be less popular and there would not be a regular course of conduct or 
regular sales of its product (albeit by the end product manufacturer) in 
Oklahoma.  Can it be that an injured Oklahoma resident is able to bring 
suit against a manufacturer of a product that is popular because it is well 
made and therefore many of the products end up in Oklahoma?  But an 
injured Oklahoma resident cannot bring suit against a manufacturer of a 
product that is less popular because it is poorly made and therefore only a 
few such products end up in Oklahoma?  Even if the low quality product is 
so poorly made that it injures every person that uses it?  The purposeful 
availment requirement should not engender such anomalous results. 
Furthermore, the determination of whether there is a high volume of 
sales is arbitrary.
285
  Therefore, a component part manufacturer lacks 
                                                                                                                          
285 As noted by Justice Ginsburg in her Nicastro dissent, there was no purposeful availment in that 
case based on the sale of a single $24,900 product. The Court presumably would, however, find 
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purposeful availment based solely on a high volume of its product ending 
up in a particular state even where the high volume results from a regular 
course of sales between the component part manufacturer and an end 
product manufacturer who sells the end product in that state. 
Consider Intel, for example.  Intel is the world’s largest semiconductor 
chip maker and describes itself as a component part manufacturer:  “We 
design and manufacture computing and communications components, such 
as microprocessors, chipsets, motherboards, and wireless and wired 
connectivity products.”286  
Intel’s largest customers are end product computer makers Hewlett-
Packard and Dell.
287
  If Intel wanted to sever any connection with 
Oklahoma—thereby avoiding purposeful availment of Oklahoma—it could 
choose to manufacture its semiconductor chips in California and to sell 
them exclusively in California.  Likewise, Intel could choose to 
manufacture and sell its semiconductor chips in every state but Oklahoma.  
Such sales might include other component part manufacturers, end product 
manufacturers, and even consumers.  But the Intel chips would still make 
their way to Oklahoma, just like the automobile in World-Wide 
Volkswagen.  If Intel did everything possible to avoid Oklahoma, there 
should be no purposeful availment. 
If Intel chooses to engage in conduct designed to result in the sale of 
its semiconductor chips to purchasers (other manufacturers, distributors, 
consumers, etc.) in Oklahoma, however, then it has purposefully availed 
itself of Oklahoma for lawsuits arising from use of those chips.   
Even if it does not make sales to Oklahoma, Intel might choose to 
engage in certain conduct directly targeting Oklahoma that constitutes 
purposeful availment of Oklahoma.  Although Intel primarily makes the 
microprocessor that powers other companies’ end products, Intel engages 
in a significant amount of sales to end product consumers/users: 
We sell our products primarily to original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) and original design manufacturers 
(ODMs).  ODMs provide design and/or manufacturing 
services to branded and unbranded private-label resellers.  In 
addition, we sell our products to other manufacturers, 
including makers of a wide range of industrial and 
communications equipment.  Our customers also include 
those who buy PC components and our other products 
through distributor, reseller, retail, and OEM channels 
                                                                                                                          
purposeful availment based on 24,900 sales of a $1 product.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2803 n.15 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
286 INTEL CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www.intc.com/intelAR2010/
download/index.html. 
287 Id. at 8. 




Intel proudly proclaims that “[t]he Intel brand is consistently ranked as 
one of the most recognizable and valuable brands in the world.”289  The 
company asserts: 
Our corporate marketing objectives are to build a strong, 
well-known Intel corporate brand that connects with 
businesses and consumers . . . . We promote brand awareness 
and generate demand through our own direct marketing as 
well as co-marketing programs.  Our direct marketing 
activities include television, print, and Internet advertising, as 
well as press relations, consumer and trade events, and 
industry and consumer communications.  We market to 
consumer and business audiences, and focus on building 
awareness and generating demand for increased performance, 
improved energy efficiency, and other capabilities such as 
Internet connectivity and security.
290
 
If Intel chooses to market and promote its brand to Oklahoma 
consumers through its global or nationwide marketing activities, then it has 
purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma—even if it makes no sales in 
Oklahoma. 
To recap, absent proof of additional conduct by a defendant targeting 
the forum state, a component part manufacturer has not purposefully 
availed itself of the forum state based on injuries caused by the component 
product in the forum state even where a high volume of the component 
product ends up in the forum state. 
This does not leave injured consumers without recourse.  Where the 
forum state lacks jurisdiction over the component part manufacturer, the 
injured consumer will seek relief from the end product manufacturer and 
distributor.  As described below, these parties control the location of the 
initial sale and the price of the product at the initial sale.  They are in the 
best position to refuse to sell the end product in particular states, to acquire 
products liability insurance, and to set appropriate prices given the risks of 
litigation in each state.
291
  The end product manufacturer also can require 
the component part manufacturer to defend and indemnify the end product 
manufacturer as part of their purchase agreement; they can further demand 
that the component part manufacturer make safer and better component 
                                                                                                                          
288 Id. at 7. 
289 Id. at Investor Information.   
290 Id. at 9. 
291 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (discussing why the 
manufacturer and distributor should be subject to suit in particular states where they have marketed 
their goods (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))). 
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parts—or stop purchasing them altogether—if the cost of business 
becomes too high as a result of defects in the component parts. 
D.  End Product Manufacturers 
Unlike component part manufacturers, end product manufacturers 
retain nearly complete control over the location of the initial sale of their 
products.
292
  The end product manufacturer either sells the product directly 
to the consumers or it sells the product to a distributor or retailer that sells 
it to the consumer.  End product manufacturers can design and control the 
distribution system for their products.
293
  “The component maker, in 
contrast, has little control over where the product ends up.”294 
If an end product manufacturer wishes to “sever its connection [with 
any particular] state” in order to avoid being haled into that state’s courts, 
it is a simple matter to refrain from marketing its product to that state and 
to refuse to make sales in that state.
295
  Thus, the end product manufacturer 
should be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever the product is sold and 
causes injury.
296
  If the end product manufacturer employs one or more 
distributors or sells the product to a retailer, it is easy to require, as a 
condition of its agreement to permit the distributor to distribute the 
product, that the distributor or retailer is precluded from making sales to 
designated states. 
To recap, where the location of an initial sale for an end product occurs 
in the forum state, an end product manufacturer has presumptively 
purposefully availed itself of the forum state where the product causes 
injury in the forum state.
297
  On the other hand, where the location of an 
                                                                                                                          
292 By referring to the location of the initial sale, I mean the handing off of the product from 
manufacturer or an authorized distributor or retailer to the consumer.  I do not mean unauthorized sales 
or resales. 
293 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108, 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that Asahi may not have 
designed, but was aware of the distribution system for its product). 
294 Freer, supra note 39, at 29. 
295 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If [the 
defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have 
been simple—it could have chosen not to sell its [Internet news] services to Pennsylvania residents.”). 
296 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (majority opinion) (“[T]hose who use Asahi components in their 
final products, and sell those products in California, [should be] subject to application of California tort 
law.”); see also Rodger D. Citron, The Case of the Retired Justice: How Would Justice John Paul 
Stevens Have Voted in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 643, 666 (2012) (“J. 
McIntyre was not selling components but rather a finished product, albeit through the use of a 
distributor.  This difference from Asahi supports the exercise of jurisdiction because J. McIntyre had 
control over whether to attempt to sell, or not sell, its products in New Jersey.” (footnote omitted)). 
297 Likewise, a distributor or retailer who makes sales of a product or provides a service in the 
forum state has presumptively purposefully availed itself of the forum state where the product causes 
injury in the forum state.  Each of the participants in the sale of an end product can protect against 
litigation in the forum state by requiring the purchaser to enter into a purchase agreement that contains 
a forum selection clause. 
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initial sale of an end product occurs in some state other than the forum 
state, an end product manufacturer has presumptively not purposefully 
availed itself of the forum state where the product causes injury in the 
forum state.  In order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must 
establish additional conduct by the defendant indicating an intent or 
purpose to serve the forum state market as described by Justice O’Connor 
in her Asahi opinion.  As discussed in the following section, conduct that 
indicates an intent or purpose to serve the entire United States market 
constitutes purposeful availment of each state where the product is sold 
and causes injury. 
E.  Internet Sales and the World Wide Web 
Purposeful availment by economic actors who make sales over the 
Internet or promote their brand or product on the World Wide Web also is 
best understood by consideration of the ability to sever a connection with a 
particular state.  Consider the examples that concerned Justice Breyer 
when drafting his opinion in Nicastro:  
But what do those standards [set forth in Justice Kennedy’s 
plurality opinion] mean when a company targets the world by 
selling products from its Web site?  And does it matter if, 
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns 
the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) 
who then receives and fulfills the orders?  And what if the 
company markets its products through popup advertisements 
that it knows will be viewed in a forum?
298
 
If a company makes initial sales of its products to consumers by direct 
Internet sales, the company can elect not to make sales to consumers who 
are physically located in disfavored states.  The company might simply ask 
the residency of the purchaser or require verification from the purchaser 
that they do not reside in a disfavored state.  Alternatively, the company 
could elect to make sales to consumers from all states, but refuse to ship to 
customers in disfavored states.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision in Granholm v. Heald,
299
 wineries are not allowed to ship to 
residents of states that prohibit direct shipment of alcohol to consumers.  
Many wineries still make Internet sales of their wine to consumers, but 
they refuse to ship to residents of particular states.
300
    
                                                                                                                          
298 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
299 544 U.S. 460, 492–93 (2005). 
300 See, e.g., Shop/Shipping, VINASA, http://www.viansa.com/index.cfm?method=storeproducts.sh
owList&productcategoryid=65271df0-911e-ca9a-6938-5c68dc82ca7a (last visited July 8, 2012) (listing 
shipping restrictions for Viansa winery);  State Shipping Laws for Wineries Portal, WINE INST., 
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Unlike in-store sales by brick-and-mortar retailers that have a physical 
presence in a particular state, retailers who choose to sell products over the 
Internet have purposefully accessed a nationwide pool of potential 
customers.  Internet retailers also have an additional, effective tool for 
avoiding purposeful availment of disfavored states beyond simply the word 
of the purchaser.  The advent of geolocation technology allows the 
operators of “[i]nternet sites to automatically and accurately identify a 
user’s geographic location.”301  Thus, Internet sales would allow a 
manufacturer to implement effective policies to avoid a disfavored 
forum.
302
   
Internet poker sites, for example, have used geolocation technology to 
prevent users located in disfavored forums from accessing their services.
303
  
In one lawsuit in Kentucky, the judge ordered the seizure of the domain 
names of 141 Internet gambling sites; the seizure was ordered subject to 
rescission once the sites installed a “geographical block [capable of] 
block[ing] and deny[ing] access to their on-line gambling sites . . . [by] any 
users or consumers within the territorial boundaries of the 
Commonwealth” of Kentucky.304 
If a manufacturer consigns sales of its products through an 
intermediary—like Amazon.com—who receives and fulfills the orders, the 
manufacturer can require as a condition of the consignment that the 
Internet retailer honor its choice not to sell and ship its products to 
consumers in disfavored states.   
Geolocation technology is particularly useful because it helps Internet 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.wineinstitute.org/initiatives/stateshippinglaws (last visited July 8, 2012) (showing a map of 
states where direct shipping is prohibited). 
301 Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal 
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63 (2011) 
[hereinafter King, Personal Jurisdiction]; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 
91 (2006) (“The technology exists to identify the geographical location of prospective users (for 
example, through the user’s IP address or digital certificates) and to deny entry to undesirable users.” 
(footnote omitted)); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location Technologies and Other Means of Placing 
Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 110 (2004) 
(stating that Internet users’ locations may be revealed by their IP addresses). 
302 King, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 301, at 63 (“This capability—unavailable just a few 
years ago—has begun to revolutionize Internet commerce and communication by enabling content 
localization, customization, and access regulation on a scale previously thought to be impossible.”). 
303 See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s 
Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 58–59 n.101 (2010) (detailing online poker sites’ 
use of geolocation tools to block certain customers from accessing their servers); Jessica Welman, 
PokerStars Blocks Washington Residents from Playing Online, BLUFF MAG. (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://news.bluffmagazine.com/pokerstars-blocks-washington-residents-from-playing-online-15911/ 
(discussing an Internet poker site’s decision to stop taking Washington state residents as customers in 
the wake of a state supreme court decision outlawing online gambling). 
304 Kentucky v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409, at *39 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 
2008), available at http://www.gpwa.org/news/Kentucky.vs.141.Internet.Domains.pdf.  
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retailers target geographic markets—for example, by use of popup 
advertisements—where their products will be particularly well-received.305  
As one scholar has explained: 
Because it is now technologically possible to restrict the 
accessibility of Internet material to specific geographical 
areas, applying a traditional analysis to nongeographically 
restricted Internet activity yields a presumption that those 
Internet actors purposefully avail themselves of every 
jurisdiction they permit their virtual conduct to reach.  
However, the widespread fear shared by many courts and 
commentators that this application of unaltered traditional 
jurisdictional principles will result in universal jurisdiction 
over Internet actors is unfounded.  Universal jurisdiction will 
hardly be the inevitable outcome of applying traditional 
principles, given the ability of defendants to avoid the 
presumption of purposeful availment by employing 
geographical restriction techniques and the role that the 
“arising-out-of” and “reasonableness” requirements of the 




As demonstrated above, because Internet retailers have the ability to 
sever their connection with a particular state, there is presumptively 
purposeful availment where they choose not to do so.
307
 
F.  Courts Should Adopt Justice Ginsburg’s Position That Marketing to 
the Entire United States Constitutes Purposeful Availment of Each 
State Where the Product Is Sold 
Justice Ginsburg’s view that marketing to the entire United States 
constitutes purposeful availment of each state where the product is sold 
was accepted by three members of the Court and may be accepted by two 
additional Justices.
308
  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, indicated that 
he is open to a rule of broader applicability if presented with a case that 
requires consideration of “relevant contemporary commercial 
                                                                                                                          
305 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1962 
(2005) (“[G]eolocation of users demonstrates that Internet participants actively target the user’s 
jurisdiction or . . . [make a choice to] refrain from interacting with users located in particular places.”). 
306 Spencer, supra note 301, at 75–76. 
307 See Reidenberg, supra note 305, at 1962 (“In effect, the technological choice either to filter or 
not to filter becomes a normative decision to ‘purposefully avail’ of the user’s forum state.  
Technological innovation that enhances interactivity also shifts the burden from demonstrating that a 
jurisdiction was targeted to showing that reasonable efforts were made to avoid contact with the 
jurisdiction.”). 
308 See discussion supra Part VI.   
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circumstances” and of the “modern day consequences” of “changes in 
commerce and communication.”309  Thus, state and trial courts should be 
open to such a position. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must accept Justice Ginsburg’s 
position.  It is consistent with the concept that there is purposeful 
availment when it was reasonably feasible for a nonresident defendant to 
prevent contacts with a particular state, but the defendant chose not to do 
so.  It will also prevent absurd and unfair results.  Consider the following 
scenarios. 
1.  Scenario One   
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to 
distribute the product in New Jersey.  The U.K. manufacturer targets New 
Jersey businesses by marketing and promoting its product in hopes of 
selling its product to them.  New Jersey is the only market targeted by the 
manufacturer and the only state where the product is sold.  The marketing 
efforts are successful; a sale occurs in New Jersey and the product—which 
is defective—later injures a worker for the New Jersey business in New 
Jersey.   
All nine Justices would agree that such conduct constitutes purposeful 
availment by defendant U.K. manufacturer because the defendant targeted 
potential New Jersey customers.
310
 
2.  Scenario Two  
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to 
distribute the product in a five-state region (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, New York, and Delaware).  The U.K. manufacturer targets 
businesses in the five-state region by marketing and promoting its product 
in the hopes of selling its product to them.  The five-state region is the only 
market targeted by the manufacturer and the product is sold only in these 
five states.  The marketing efforts are successful; a sale occurs in New 
Jersey and the product—which is defective—later injures a worker for the 
New Jersey business in New Jersey.   
                                                                                                                          
309 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
310 Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (“Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in 
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.”); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Here, the relevant 
facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court show no ‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in 
New Jersey; and there is no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related design, advertising, 
marketing, or anything else.  Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has 
shown no specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey.”); id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its machines in 
the United States, ‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a 
single State or a discrete collection of States.  McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all 
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”).   
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Again, all nine Justices would agree that such conduct constitutes 
purposeful availment of New Jersey because the defendant targeted 
potential New Jersey customers.
311
  
3.  Scenario Three  
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to 
distribute the product in forty-nine states (including New Jersey) and the 
District of Columbia.  The U.K. manufacturer targets businesses in every 
state except New York by marketing and promoting its product in hopes of 
selling its product to them.  The U.K. manufacturer took care to avoid 
marketing its product in New York.  The marketing efforts are successful, 
a sale occurs in New Jersey and the product—which is defective—later 
injures a worker for the New Jersey business in New Jersey.   
Again, all nine Justices presumably would agree that the defendant’s 
actions constitute purposeful availment of New Jersey because the 
defendant targeted potential New Jersey customers while choosing to avoid 
a disfavored forum in New York.
312
 
4.  Scenario Four:  J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro 
A U.K. manufacturer hired a U.S. company to act as its “exclusive 
distributor for the entire United States.”313 The U.K. manufacturer did not 
instruct its distributor to avoid particular states.  Instead, the defendant 
designed and manufactured the product to conform to United States 
specifications and instructed the distributor to sell its product “anywhere in 
the United States.”314  
The U.K. manufacturer marketed its product in the United States by, 
among other things, attending sixteen years worth of annual trade shows 
held in New Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, and San Francisco.
315
  At the 
trade shows, the U.K. manufacturer exhibited its products, hoping to reach 
anyone interested in the machine in the United States.
316
  The marketing 
efforts were successful.  A sale occurred in New Jersey to a New Jersey 
business, and the product—which was defective—later injured a worker 
for the New Jersey business in New Jersey.
317
   
In this case, six Justices determined that the defendant’s actions did not 
constitute purposeful availment.  As Justice Kennedy noted, “These facts 
may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. 
                                                                                                                          
311 Id. at 2792. 
312 Id.  
313 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
314 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 578, 593 (N.J. 2010).  
315 Id. at 579. 
316 Id. at 578–79 
317 Id. at 577–78.  
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McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”318   
This argument is illogical; it is contrary to reason to conclude that a 
manufacturer who endeavors to sell its product in every state has not 
purposefully availed itself of any state.
319
  But even aside from this flawed 
logic, it would have been easy for J. McIntyre to refuse to market its 
product to New Jersey customers and to require its distributor to refuse to 
sell its product to New Jersey customers.  All J. McIntyre had to do was 
make a contractual agreement with the distributor that the distributor 
would not sell to New Jersey.  Absent such an agreement, J. McIntyre 
could refuse to engage the distributor.  Had J. McIntyre done this, there 
would have been no sales in New Jersey that subsequently led to its being 
haled to court there.  
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Breyer opened his Nicastro concurrence by acknowledging 
“that there have been many recent changes in commerce and 
communication . . . which are not anticipated by [the Court’s] 
precedents.”320  But it was more than fifty years ago that the Court 
recognized that the expansion of commerce, the availability of long-
distance transportation, and the increase in communication technology has 
resulted in an expansion of the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations and nonresidents.
321
  Since that time, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged that the “limits imposed on state jurisdiction by 
the Due Process Clause, in its role as guarantor against inconvenient 
litigation, have been substantially relaxed over the years” due to the 
increase in national and international commerce and the availability and 
affordability of modern communication and transportation.
322
 
The point here is not that the Court should modify its personal 
jurisdiction doctrine to expand the exercise of jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                          
318 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
319 See Richards, Purposeful Availment, supra note 129 (“Under this rule, a defendant who reaps 
the benefits of a national market is subject to jurisdiction [sic] only a single state; whereas a defendant 
that asked its distributor to focus on sales in, say, a dozen states would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in all of them.”); Drobak, supra note 8 (“If the defendant had told its distributor to sell to 
customers ‘in all 50 states,’ would the plurality have found the requisite intention to target New Jersey?  
What if the defendant had told the distributor to sell to customers in Alabama and then listed the other 
49 states by name?  There is absolutely no difference between telling a distributor to serve the U.S. 
market and the two examples just mentioned.”). 
320 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
321 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957). 
322 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“[I]t is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life 
that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state 
lines.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (“As technological progress has increased 
the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction . . . has undergone a similar increase.”). 
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nonresidents.  Rather, the point is that the Court cannot base its personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence on a fiction.  Today, commerce is often national 
or even global.  Corporations are, by their nature, driven by a desire for 
profit.  Like the U.K. manufacturer in Nicastro, end product manufacturers 
generally want to sell their products anywhere and everywhere.
323
  
McIntyre U.K. viewed the U.S. as a single market.  If McIntyre U.K. 
wanted to avoid New Jersey, it could have done so.  Instead, McIntyre 
U.K. chose to accept the risk of its product being sold in New Jersey.  That 
is purposeful availment.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Nicastro should 
be short-lived because it is inconsistent with personal jurisdiction doctrine 
and the reasoning behind the purposeful availment requirement. 
On the other hand, component part manufacturers generally lack the 
ability to control where their products are sold after they are incorporated 
in an end product.  Where a component part manufacturer makes a product 
that is very popular because of its high quality, it will be incorporated into 
end products manufactured by numerous end product manufacturers.  It 
will inevitably wind up in the hands of consumers in most or all fifty 
states.  That is not purposeful availment because the component part 
manufacturer cannot “structure [its] primary conduct” so as to avoid 




Component part manufacturers will have extra protection where 
purposeful availment is established.  End product manufacturers, by 
contrast, will purposefully avail themselves of every state where their 
products are sold and cause injury.  This is consistent with the purposeful 
availment requirement and it is the optimal result.
325
  End product 
manufacturers can respond by limiting the states where their products are 
sold.  States might then compete to attract end product manufacturers, as 
well as their distributors and retailers, to sell the product in a particular 
state “by weakening their product liability law or otherwise tilting their 
procedural and choice of law rules to favor defendants.”326  End product 
manufacturers also could expand the range of states where they make their 
product available by charging a greater price in states with less favorable 
                                                                                                                          
323 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This case is illustrative of marketing 
arrangements for sales in the United States common in today's commercial world.  A foreign-country 
manufacturer engages a U.S. company to promote and distribute the manufacturer's products, not in 
any particular State, but anywhere and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract 
purchasers.”). 
324 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.  
325 Klerman, supra note 265, at 34 (“[A] rule that allows the plaintiff to sue where she purchased 
the product is likely to lead to the best results.”). 
326 Id. at 4.  




And, of course, a finding of purposeful availment does not mean that 
there is necessarily personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  
Justice Breyer will take comfort in the fact that a defendant can still argue 
that it would be unfair to exercise jurisdiction despite the defendant’s 
purposeful availment of the forum state. 
                                                                                                                          
327 See id. (“A jurisdictional rule which allowed plaintiffs to sue where they bought the product 
(but not necessarily where the accident occurred) allows manufacturers to vary the price depending on 
the legal characteristics of the state where the product was sold.”). 
